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BRIEF OP APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the features of the UTIA which authorize 
UTFC to put public money at risk in aid of selected, private, 
start-up, high-technology business ventures violate the 
requirement of Article VI, Section 29 of the Utah Constitution 
that the Legislature shall not authorize the State to lend its 
credit or subscribe to stock in aid of any private enterprise? 
2. Whether under Article VII, Section 16 of the Utah 
Constitution, the Attorney General has the exclusive right to 
represent UTFC? 
PROVISIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 29: 
Sec. 29. [Lending public credit 
forbidden.] 
The Legislature shall not authorize 
the State, or any county, city, town, 
township, district or other political 
subdivision of the State to lend its credit 
or subscribe to stock or bonds in aid of any 
railroad, telegraph or other private 
individual or corporate enterprise or 
undertaking. 
Utah Constitution, Article VII, Section 16: 
Sec. 16. [Duties of Attorney General.] 
The Attorney General shall be the 
legal adviser of the State officers, except 
as otherwise provided by this Constitution, 
and shall perform such other duties as 
provided by law. 
U.C.A. §§ 63-60-1 through 6. (See Appendix A). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case concerns the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of the f i r s t 
s ta tu te in the h i s tory of t h i s State to authorize d irect use of 
publ ic money for the purpose of taking an equity i n t e r e s t or 
making an unsecured loan or grant in d irect a id of a pr iva te , 
s t a r t - u p , business venture. 
The Utah Technology and Innovation Act ("UTIA") was 
o r i g i n a l l y enacted in 1983 f creat ing an e n t i t y known as the Utah 
Technology Finance Corporation ("UTFC"). No funds were 
appropriated to UTFC for that f i s c a l year . In 19 85 Amendments to 
the Act were e f f ec ted through S.B. No. 1 of the June, 1985 
Specia l Sess ion; both the Senate sponsor and the House manager of 
the b i l l were UTFC Trustees as we l l as L e g i s l a t o r s . (R. UTFC 
a c t i o n , 536) # 1 As amended in 1985, the Act termed UTFC an 
"independent publ ic corporation" and authorized i t , i n t a r .ali^f 
t o make "equity investment in or d i r e c t loans t o emerging and 
developing technolog ica l and innovat ive small bus inesses" or 
grants . U.C.A., 1953, §§ 63-60-4(2) (c)&(i) (Supp. 1 9 8 5 ) . 2 The 
purpose of the Act, according t o the l e g i s l a t i v e statement added 
in the 19 85 amendments, i s t o encourage "progress and increasing 
1
 The record for UTFC's act ion w i l l be referred t o as "UTFC 
act ion". The record for the ac t ion of the Attorney General and 
State Treasurer w i l l be referred to as "AG act ion". 
2
 The ac t as amended in 19 85 i s made Appendix A and attached 
hereto . The act was amended again in the 19 86 General Session by 
S.B. No. 254, in part t o remove provis ions which the D i s t r i c t 
Court had found unconst i tut ional in h i s Memorandum Decis ion of 
December 26, 19 85. One of these provis ions had required two 
l e g i s l a t o r s t o be on the UTFC Board and one had exempted UTFC's 
funds from the custody of the S ta te Treasurer. 
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product iv i ty" within the Sta te of Utah and to "create new 
employment oppor tun i t i e s . " To implement the Actf the S ta te 
Legis la ture has appropriated $3.7 mil l ion to DTFC plus an 
addi t ional $891f800 for f i s c a l year 1986-87. 
DTFC has issued a l e t t e r of in tent to Venture Fund I 
ind ica t ing UTFCfs in t en t to commit $1 mil l ion of publ ic funds to 
purchase an unsecured l imi ted par tnersh ip i n t e r e s t with a "high 
degree of r isk" in Venture Fund I . (R. DTFC ac t ion , 6; R. DTFC 
ac t ion , 470, Venture Fund I subscription-memorandum-facing page, 
Appendix B.) Venture Fund I i s a f o r -p ro f i t l imi ted par tnersh ip ; 
i t s only general partner i s a fo r -p ro f i t corporation, Impetus 
Inc. Venture Fund I and Impetus Inc. propose to use the publ ic 
money received from DTFC to subscribe to new issues of stock in 
se lected, p r iva te , s t a r t - u p , high-technology business ventures . 
The D i s t r i c t Court approved DTFC's asser ted r igh t under 
the Act to grant publ ic money to se lected, p r iva t e , high-tech 
ventures , obtaining in return a t most only the r igh t to receive a 
3% royal ty on re su l t ing commercial p r o f i t s , if there are any. 
(R. DTFC ac t ion , 592-93); D.C.A., 1953, §§ 63-60-4 (2) (i) and 63-
60-5(1) (Supp. 1985); (R. DTFC ac t ion , 427, Paragraph 20) 
The D i s t r i c t Court cor rec t ly found tha t DTFC receives 
appropriated publ ic funds'^ and i s an agency of s t a t e government 
within the Executive Branch. Memorandum Decision, Appendix C a t 
1 1 , 13-14. All members of i t s governing board are appointed by 
6
 R. AG act ion, 27, Memorandum Decision, Appendix C, a t 2 , 14; 
£££ a l so , R. DTFC ac t ion , 492. 
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the Governor. It isf in short, a State entity run by 
gubernatorial appointees directed by statute to spend public 
moneys in ways that include making direct equity acquisitions, 
unsecured loansf and grants in direct aid of privately-owned, 
start-up, high-technology businesses. 
The controversy over UTFC's constitutional authority to 
transfer public money to new private ventures, was precipitated 
by DTFCfs statement of intent in November, 19 84 to put $1 million 
of public funds in Venture Fund I. 
Represented by its independent retained legal counsel, 
UTFC filed a declaratory judgment action on July 19f 19 85 against 
the Utah Attorney Generalf seeking a declaration that the Act is 
constitutional and that UTFC is lawfully authorized to spend 
funds appropriated by the Legislature (including appropriated 
funds currently in its possession) in return for equity interests 
in Utah high technology businesses.4 On September 4, 19 85 the 
Attorney General and the State Treasurer in turn filed an action 
seeking a declaration that the Act both on its face and as 
applied violates several provisions of the Utah Constitution.5 
In additionf the Attorney General and Treasurer sought a 
4
 This filing occurred 3 days after the amending billf S.B. No. 1 
of the June, 1985 Special Sessionf took effect. 
5
 The Constitutional provisions on which the Attorney General and 
State Treasurer relied included the prohibition of Article VI, 
Section 29 against legislative authorization of the State or any 
political subdivision "to lend its credit or subscribe to stock 
or bonds in aid of any . . . private individual or corporate 
enterprise or undertaking", and Article VII, Section 16, which 
vests exclusive authority in the Attorney General to represent 
"state officers." 
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declaration that the actions of UTPC were violative of the Utah 
Open and Public Meetings law and therefore void, and that 
unexpended appropriations for fiscal year 1984-85 must be 
returned to the General Fund and Mineral Lease Fund. 
The two lawsuits were consolidated by the District 
Court, and both sides moved for summary judgment. 
The court ruled in the appellees1 favor concerning the 
applicability of Article VI, Section 29fs prohibition against 
lending the state1s credit or subscribing to stock in aid of 
private enterprise. The principal basis for this decision was 
the courtfs conclusion that the legislation is for a "public 
purpose", namely "the creation of employment and encouragement of 
innovation" which it found to provide a "rational basis" for the 
private investment authorization. Memorandum Decision, Appendix 
C at 5. 
With respect to the Attorney Generalfs exclusive 
representational authority, the court held that under Hansen v. 
Utah State Retirement Board. 652 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1982), the state 
officers for whom the Attorney General has exclusive 
representational authority are limited to agencies "within the 
direct supervision of the Governor", and that UTFC does not fit 
in this category. Memorandum Decision, Appendix C at 11. The 
court also held in favor of UTFC on several other issues. 
The District Court ruled in the appellants1 favor that 
the particular contract with Venture Fund I was voidable because 
the decision to enter into the contract was not made in an open 
meeting with proper notices as required by the Utah Open and 
-5-
Public Meetings law. Memorandum Decision, Appendix C at 11-12, 
14. It ruled also that since DTFC was an executive agency, 
membership of two legislators on DTPCfs Board of Trustees 
violated the separation of powers requirement of Article V, 
Section I. Id. at 13. The court further ruled that the Actfs 
exclusion of the State Treasurer as custodian of DTFCfs public 
funds violated Article VII, Section 15, and declared that UTFC 
should return its unexpended funds to the custody of the State 
Treasurer until such time as they are expended. Xd. at 9-10, 13 
The Attorney General filed a Notice of Appeal on 
February 11, 1986. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The features of the statute which authorize UTFC to 
make at-risk equity acquisitions, loans, and grants in direct aid 
of private, start-up, high technology, business ventures, violate 
the plain mandate of Article VI, Section 29 that the Legislature 
shall not authorize the State to lend its credit or subscribe to 
stock in aid of any private enterprise. 
The constitutional history of this Section also makes 
it very clear that the features of the statute which authorize 
placing public money at risk in aid of private enterprise are 
precisely what the Framers of our Constitution meant to prohibit. 
The fact that the Legislature has stated a public benefit only 
emphasizes a square conflict between the statute and the 
Constitution. The unmistakable purpose of Article VI, Section 29 
was to remove from the legislative prerogative decisions 
-6-
concerning which a t - r i s k loans , grants , and stock subscr ipt ions 
in aid of pr ivate en te rpr i se were in the public i n t e r e s t , and 
which were not. If tha t judgment had been l e f t to the 
Legis la ture to exercise on a case-by-case bas i s , there would have 
been no need for Ar t i c l e VI, Section 29. 
This i s the f i r s t time in Utah's h is tory tha t t h i s 
Court has considered a s t a t u t e which f a l l s squarely within the 
cons t i tu t iona l prohib i t ion . Past decisions of t h i s Court are a l l 
consis tent with the language and h is tory of Ar t i c l e VI, Section 
29. The decision of the D i s t r i c t Court i s not. 
Under Ar t i c l e VII, Section 16 of the Utah Const i tut ion, 
the Attorney General i s d i rected to be the exclusive lega l 
representa t ive for UTFC. This r e s u l t obtains because UTFC i s a 
Sta te Executive Agency under the supervisory control of State 
o f f i ce r s , because v i r t u a l l y a l l of UTFC's money i s appropriated, 
publ ic money, and because i t i s e s sen t i a l tha t the Executive 
Branch speak with one voice in advocating s t a t e pol icy. 
ARGUMENT 
I . 
THE FEATURES OF THE UTIA WHICH AUTHORIZE 
PUBLIC TAXPAYER MONEY TO BE PUT AT RISK IN 
EQUITY INTERESTS, LOANS AND GRANTS IN DIRECT 
AID OF PRIVATE, START-UP BUSINESS VENTURES 
VIOLATE ARTICLE V I , SECTION 2 9 , OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION 
The D i s t r i c t Court ' s fundamental error i s i t s profound 
misunderstanding of the signif icance of Ar t i c le VI, Section 29 of 
the Utah Const i tut ion to the a t - r i s k equity purchase, loan, and 
grant features of the Utah Technology and Innovation Act. 
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The constitutional standard to which the lower court 
subjected the Section 29 issue is the most permissive standard 
known to constitutional law: whether the legislation has a 
proper "public purpose" and whether there is a "rational basis" 
for what the Legislature has done in an attempt to achieve that 
purpose. This is the standard that for the past half century 
courts in this country have applied to test the constitutionality 
of state statutes attacked as violative of substantive due 
process. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Freeman V, 
Centerville City. Utahf 1003, 1005-06 (1979); Jennings Vt Mahony, 
Dtahf 485 P.2d 1404, 1406-07 (1971). The rational basis test is 
appropriate for substantive due process challenges because the 
constitutional provision on which such challenges rest is 
extremely broad and indefinite, capable of bringing within its 
unlimited sweep virtually all legislative enactments. 
Accordingly, the constitutional test for substantive due process 
challenges must be correspondingly lenient, lest courts be vested 
with the discretion to invalidate legislative judgments virtually 
at will. 
But the constitutional provision that governs here is 
not a dragnet provision like the due process clause. Its 
language is narrow and precise. And the extensive history of its 
passage leaves no doubt that its purpose was to prevent precisely 
what happened here: a legislative decision placing taxpayer 
money at risk in direct aid of new, private businesses. 
It is not often that the framers of constitutional 
provisions spell out their intent with such clarity and such 
-8-
precision as occurred in th i s case* That intent having been 
stated so e x p l i c i t l y , i t must prevail* As this Court stated in 
Jenkins v. Bishop. Utah, 589 P.2d 770, 771 (1978): "Under the 
universally recognized rule of construction, constitutional 
provisions should be interpreted and applied in accordance with 
what was intended by i t s framers." 
Whether or not i t i s a good idea for the state to 
acquire an equity interest , or make an unsecured loan or grant, 
in direct aid of a new private corporation i s to ta l ly irrelevant. 
Similarly irrelevant i s whether using the State 's money in these 
ways serves a public purpose. The only issue i s whether these 
money-use features of the UTIA f a l l fa ir ly within the prohibition 
of Article VI, Section 29 of the Utah Constitution. Both the 
plain language of that Section and also i t s l e g i s l a t i v e history 
clearly reveal that they do. That conclusion i s also consistent 
with this Court's prior decisions, as well as with basic 
principles of constitutional and statutory construction. 
Each of these supports for appellant's position wil l be 
separately examined. 
A. The Plain Language of Article VI, Section 29 _ 
Controls 
In deciding issues of constitutionality, courts are frequently 
handicapped by the breadth and vagueness of the constitutional 
language. Article VI, Section 29 by contrast, speaks in precise 
terms. It provides in its entirety: 
The Legislature shall not authorize the 
State, or county, city, town, township, 
district, or other political subdivision of 
-9-
the State to lend its credit or subscribe to 
stock or bonds in aid of any railroad, 
telegraph, or other private individual/ or 
corporate enterprise, or undertaking. 
There is nothing vague or uncertain about this 
provision. In the clearest possible language it prohibits the 
State from lending its credit, or subscribing to stock, in aid of 
any private business. Here, exactly what Section 29 prohibits is 
what is being attempted. DTFC issued a letter of intent to 
Venture Fund I indicating DTFCfs intent to commit $1 million (now 
reduced to $700,000 according to UTFCfs statement in the 
injunction hearing) of public money to buy a limited partnership 
interest involving a "high degree of risk" in Venture Fund I. In 
turn, Venture Fund I will spend that money to subscribe to new 
issues of stock in new, high-tech ventures chosen by its for-
profit General partner, Impetus, Inc. OTFC also asserts the 
right under the Act to make grants of public money to new, high-
tech ventures, obtaining in return at most only the right to 
receive a 3% royalty on resulting commercial profits; there is, 
of course, no assurance that there will be any profits. 
This Courtfs precedents are discussed in subsection C. 
A summary of those precedents is relevant to the present 
discussion of the plain meaning of Section 29 because they show 
that this Court has been faithful to that plain meaning. This 
Court has never upheld a direct equity purchase in or direct loan 
or grant to a private, start-up company, using public money. As 
discussed below in subsection C, the Court has upheld a variety 
of programs under which private enterprises incidentally 
benefited from the expenditure of State money but the public 
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effect was dominant. Those cases all fall fairly within the 
purview of legitimate interpretation of this constitutional 
provision. But they do not extend Section 29 beyond the 
narrowest scope that its words will permit. 
This statute offends the narrowest possible reading 
that can be given to the constitutional language. Heref unlike 
previous cases the Court has considered, the statute calls for 
"the State . . . to lend its credit or subscribe to stock . . . 
in aid of . . . private . . . enterprise." Here, for the first 
time in Utah1s history, the plain language of the statute cannot 
be reconciled with the plain language of Section 29. 
Significantly, the District Court did not even attempt 
to measure the direct investment features of the DTIA against the 
actual language of Section 29. Had he done so, he surely would 
not have decided this case by asking simply whether the 
Legislature had acted reasonably. The purpose of a 
constitutional provision is to remove decisions as to what is and 
what is not reasonable from the legislative prerogative. 
At the end of the day, we are left with the reality 
that Article VI, Section 29, is part of the Utah Constitution. 
It must mean something. If Section 29 does not prohibit the 
venture-capital,6 direct loan, and grant features of the UTIA 
then what does it prohibit? If it does not prohibit the very 
thing that occurred and would occur through UTFC subscription in 
the proposed high-risk venture fund and UTFC grants to new high-
tech ventures, then what does it prohibit? 
6
 Terms used in the statute include "equity interests" (§ 63-60-
4(2)(e)), and "direct capital investment" (§ 63-60-5(2)). 
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B. The History of A r t i c l e VI. Sect ion 2 9 ' s Passage i s 
£ l£££ 
For the foregoing reasonsf the constitutional language 
could not be more plain* This, without more, requires a ruling 
in appellantfs favor. 
There isf however, more. Two chapters of 
constitutional history reveal beyond any doubt that in Utah it is 
unconstitutional to do what the Legislature attempted to do in 
the UTIA. One of those chapters was written in 1895, and the 
other in 1974. 
1. The 1895 Constitutional Convention. This State is 
blessed with a remarkably detailed account of the debates that 
occurred during the Constitutional Convention of 1895. It is 
contained in the document entitled, Proceedings of the Utah 
Constitutional Convention of 1895 ("Proceedings'1). 
The issue whether the Utah Legislature should be denied 
the constitutional power to use the State's money and credit for 
purposes of gifts, loans and speculative investments in private 
enterprise because of perceived public benefits from such schemes 
was one of the most intensely disputed issues of the 
constitutional convention. It also provided some of the highest 
drama and some of the most brilliant oratory. 
The debate on this issue lasted over parts of four 
separate days, April 11, 12, 13, and 15, 1895 (April 14 was a 
Sunday and there was no session). The first attempt to provide 
such a limitation on legislative power would have required a two-
thirds vote of the Legislature before direct loans or investments 
for private benefit could be made. That proposition failed. 
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(Proceedings, at 92 8.) The limitation presently contained in 
Section 297 was then introduced the next day. Xd. at 951. And 
it eventually passed. Xd. at 957. The following Monday a motion 
to reconsider was defeated. Xdr at 1002-03. 
Despite protestations by some that the issue wasf or 
should bef non-partisanf most of the proponents for the 
limitation on private investments were Democrats/ and most of 
those who opposed were Republicans. The differences between the 
two camps were cleanly identified/ and any objective reading of 
the debates leaves no doubt that all who participated in them — 
including those who favored and those who opposed — knew that 
the language of this section meant what it said: if passed/ the 
State was to stay out of the business of placing its money at 
risk/ whether by loanf gift/ or equity acquisition/ in aid of any 
private enterprise/ regardless of how great the benefit to the 
public from such loanf gift/ or equity acquisition. Supporters 
of Section 29 thought that that result (keeping the State out of 
private ventures) would be good and opponents thought it would be 
bad. But no one was under any illusions as to what the result 
would be. 
The case against Section 29 at the constitutional 
convention is basically the same as the argument currently 
advanced in favor of the constitutionality of the loanf grant and 
equity acquisition features of the Technology and Innovation Act. 
1
 It was Section 36 as proposed by Mr. Varian at the convention 
and Section 31 as it formerly appeared in the State Constitution 
as adopted. 
-13-
George M. Cannon, one of the leading opponents, made exactly the 
same argument that today is made by the appellees and the lower 
court. He argued that the Legislature should not be restricted 
in deciding how the State's funds should be spent for the benefit 
of its citizens* "So far as I'm concerned, I am willing to leave 
the whole matter to the people of Utah and to their 
representatives in the Legislature." Xd. at 905. He also 
pointed out, as did many others, that significant public benefits 
can result from the investment of public funds in private 
businesses, and that the Legislature should be left free to make 
a determination concerning whether in any particular case the 
public is likely to benefit or not. j£££, e.g., ProceedingSr at 
901 (Mr. Goodwin), 905 (Mr. Cannon)f and 908 (Mr. James). 
For present purposes the important points to note are 
(1) the arguments made by Mr. Cannon and his allies were the 
identical arguments made by the appellees and the district courtf 
and (2) theirs was the position that the convention delegates 
ultimately rejected. By far the most prominent example used by 
both sides was the "bounty" which the Territory had apparently 
paid to a sugar factory in Lehi. Mr. Cannon stated: "I claim 
. . , that the people of Utah in dollars and cents have received 
more money back than was expended from the public treasury for 
the sugar factory bounty." Xd. at 905. 
This argument that private investment can yield public 
benefit — and that the Legislature should be free to make its 
own determination on a case-to-case basis whether the public good 
will in fact be served by private investment — was a consistent 
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theme of the opponents throughout the debate. I t had a l s o , 
apparently, been one of the i s s u e s during the e l e c t i o n the 
preceding f a l l . Mr. James, one of the opponents, asserted that 
"th is quest ion was discussed from Saint George to Logan on the 
stump l a s t f a l l . I t i s the i s sue that the campaign was upon, and 
i t i s the i s s u e that buried the Democratic party from Cal i fornia 
to Maine." Xd. at 907. Mr. James a l so r e l i e d on examples in 
which other countries had used t h e i r f inanc ia l resources to 
promote pr ivate companies in the publ ic i n t e r e s t . Xd. at 90 8. 
The fundamental argument of the proponents, by 
contrast , was that the power to tax i s the most awesome power of 
government and that i f no l i m i t s were to be placed on the power 
of the Utah Leg i s la ture to tax i t s c i t i z e n s , then at l e a s t , the 
Legis lature should be barred from using those tax monies to aid 
pr ivate enterpr i se . £££ , e . g . , Proceedings at 894-95 (Mr. B. H. 
Roberts) , 913-914 (Mr. Franklin S. Richards), and 911 (Mr. Samuel 
R. Thurman). Their view on t h i s matter was as unqualif ied as was 
the language that they eventual ly succeeded in persuading a 
majority of the Convention t o adopt. Mr. Richards asserted that 
no " p o l i t i c a l subdiv is ion of the State has the right to pledge 
i t s cred i t or to give public money for any pr ivate en terpr i se , no 
matter what i t may be." Xd. at 914 (emphasis suppl i ed) . 
B.H. Roberts, probably the most eloquent and p r o l i f i c 
of the proponents, decried the e v i l s that had f a l l e n upon the 
s t a t e s of Tennessee and I l l i n o i s for using t h e i r publ ic cred i t 
for private purposes, opining that "the r e s u l t had been followed 
with d i s a s t e r , showing, s i r , that t h i s doctrine i s v i c i o u s in i t s 
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results, as it is vicious in its principle." Xd. at 898. 
Accordingly/ the proponents1 objective was to prevent "taking 
private property for private uses under any circumstances . . . 
and that, sirf I take it is the question that underlies the 
discussion that is now in progress — the taking of private money 
by the strong arm of government for private uses." Xd* at 523..^  
What cannot be ignored is that in the proponents1 
view — the prevailing view — the fact that the public would 
benefit was immaterial. The evil that they prohibited was 
exactly what they said they prohibited: any use of public money 
which might benefit private companies. The prohibition existed 
regardless of the public benefit, because "corporations largely 
are not formed for the sole and patriotic purpose of giving 
employment to peoplef but for amassing wealth to be used by 
themselves personally and individually." id. at 927 (Mr. 
Roberts). Thus, the purpose of the prohibition was "to prevent 
the pledging of the credit of the State for any private 
enterprise whatever." Id. at 890 (Mr. Richards). 
0
 Some of the precise consequences that the proponents of Section 
29 feared have in fact come to pass under the DTIA. These 
include potential conflicts of interest and investment of public 
money in ventures which are, almost by definitionf highly risky 
and unable to attract the usual financing sources. (For example, 
the State Treasurer is barred from holding this type of 
speculative interest by U.C.A. , 1953, § 51-7-11(3) (Supp. 1985)). 
With regard to conflicts of interest, Mr. Evans warned that if 
"private enterprises and corporations can organize and apply to 
the State through its officials and representatives for aid, 
. . . a great abuse of power will naturally follow." Proceedings 
at 952. That those are legitimate concerns is shown by the 
record evidence of actual conflicts of interest that have 
occurred in this case and which reflect use and potential use of 
public moneys in ways that effect yet additional benefits to 
private-enterprise interests of the persons involved in the 
conflicts. See Paragraphs 3-10, 15-16 of the UNDISPUTED FACTS, 
R. UTFC action, 310-11, Appendix D. 
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The debate that occurred on the first day pertained to 
a proposal which would have limited the legislative power by 
requiring that public investment in private enterprises be 
accomplished only on a two-thirds vote. The measure which 
eventually passed attacked the problem from a different 
perspective, but the issues were the same. Mr. Cannon, speaking 
in favor of the motion to reconsider on Saturday, April 13, 
asserted, "I claim that the state has the right to use the credit 
that belongs to the people for the benefit of the people. I 
claim that it has the right to build railroads and use the credit 
for that purpose where the people will be directly benefited by 
it." Id. at 986. 
And that was the issue: whether the new State was to 
have the power to use the State1 s financial resources for private 
purposes "where the people will be directly benefited by it." 
Id. That was the issue that occupied large portions of four days 
of the constitutional debate. And on that issue Mr. Cannon and 
his supporters lost, and Mr. Roberts and his supporters won. 
Accordingly, the issue whether there is or is not a public 
benefit from state investment in aid of private enterprise is 
simply not a relevant concern. That issue was removed from the 
realm of issues with which the Utah Legislature was to be 
entitled to deal. 
Messrs. Cannon and James and Goodwin spoke to that 
issue with force and clarity. And they lost. To argue that the 
private-business-assistance features of the Utah Technology and 
Innovation Act are constitutional because they are based on 
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benefits to the public rather than private persons and entities 
is to attempt to re-argue the very issue that so consumed this 
State1s Constitution Makers during the mid-April days of 1895. 
And there is no question that those framing fathers knew what 
they were doing. They were taking away from the Legislature a 
very significant power to make a decision concerning the public 
benefit. George M. Cannon and his colleagues said that the 
Legislature should have that power. B.H. Roberts and his allies 
said that they should not. To attempt now, ninety years later, 
to justify a statute providing for the use of public funds in 
direct aid of start-up, proprietary companies because of 
perceived public benefits amounts to nothing less than repeal of 
an important constitutional provision without observing the 
constitutional prerequisites for constitutional amendment.9 
It would be the ultimate constitutional irony if — in 
the first case falling squarely within the intendment of Section 
29 — a district court of this State were allowed posthumously to 
award to George M. Cannon the victory over B. H. Roberts which the 
Framers duly denied him. 
2. The Constitutional Proposal of 1974. Twelve years 
ago, the advocates of giving the Legislature the authority to use 
public money in aid of private enterprise for public benefit 
9
 Ironically, though the District Court said of Article VII, 
Section 15 (duties of the State Treasurer) that its "wording 
could not be clearer", the court made no reference to the clarity 
of Section 29fs wording. Similarly, with regard to Article V, 
Section 1 (allocation of governmental powers) the District Court 
spoke of what the "framers of the Utah Constitution intended" but 
was entirely silent as to the unusually clear intent of the 
framers regarding Section 29. 
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submitted to the Utah e l e c t o r a t e a proposi t ion which would have 
amended Sect ion 29 in pert inent part as f o l l o w s : "the 
Legis la ture s h a l l not authorize the S t a t e , or any p o l i t i c a l 
subdiv is ion of the S ta te to lend i t s c red i t except to aid in the 
establishment or expansion of pr ivate industry, within the 
S t a t e , " 1974 Utah Laws, S.J.R. No. 3 (Emphasis suppl i ed) . 
The Utah voters re jec ted t h i s proposed change by an 
almost two to one margin, 240,813 to 1 2 9 , 8 3 3 . 1 0 Manifest ly, i f 
the Leg i s la ture had already had that power, there would have been 
no need for the proposed amendment. 
The ult imate thrust of the D i s t r i c t Court1s ra t iona le 
i s that the Const i tut ion can be amended by a simple majority vote 
of both Houses of the Leg i s la ture and the Governor fs approval. 
This i s a l so the approach taken by the a p p e l l e e s , who urged the 
D i s t r i c t Court to uphold the UTIA because the Leg is la ture has 
determined that i t serves a publ ic purpose. The lower court 
accepted that argument and converted i t in to the foundational 
premise underlying i t s holding: "The same e l e c t o r a t e which 
e s t a b l i s h e s the Const i tut ion a l so e l e c t s representat ives to make 
i t s laws." (Memorandum Decis ion , Appendix C at 4 - 5 ) . 
This astounding statement i s e s s e n t i a l to the D i s t r i c t 
Court's judgment and to the appe l l ees 1 p o s i t i o n in support of i t . 
And whi le i t i s very true that "the same e l e c t o r a t e which 
e s t a b l i s h e s the c o n s t i t u t i o n a lso e l e c t s representat ives to make 
i t s laws ," i t does not fol low that the Const i tut ion can be 
1 0
 R. OTPC ac t ion 309, 370-72; Paragraph 1 of UNDISPUTED FACTS, 
Appendix D. 
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disregarded by those representatives. The notion turns the very 
concept of a written constitution on its head. The only reason 
for a constitution is to limit the powers of government. And the 
chief governmental entity whose powers are limited is the 
Legislature. Under the District Court's rationalef therefore, 
the same Legislature whose powers are the main reason a 
constitution is necessary can succeed in overriding the 
Constitution without any resort to the amendment process. As 
stated by this Court in Berry v> Beech Aircraft Corp., 2 9 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3, 8 (1985) "Itlhat kind of analysis would result in 
the legislative powers prevailing in every casef and would 
deprive . • . constitutional [provisions] of any meaningful 
content or force."11 
The only response the appellees have ever made to the 
overwhelmingly clear language and history of Article VI, Section 
1 1
 This basic principle of constitutional supremacy is deeply 
rooted in our constitutional jurisprudence. Almost 200 years 
before Berry v. Beech Aircraft, the Federalist, No. 78 (written 
by Hamilton) stated as follows: 
No legislative act, therefore, contrary to 
the Constitution can be valid. To deny this 
would be to affirm that the deputy is greater 
than his principal; that the servant is above 
his master; that the representatives of the 
people are superior to the people themselves; 
that men, acting by virtue of powers, may do 
not only what their powers do not authorize, 
but what they forbid. 
If it be said that the legislative body 
are themselves the constitutional judges of 
their own powers, and that the construction 
they put upon them is conclusive upon the 
other departments, it may be answered that 
this cannot be the natural presumption, where 
it is not to be collected from any particular 
provisions in the Constitution. 
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29, is that "it was adopted . . . to prevent state and local 
government from using tax money to engage in private business 
ventures thereby enriching private interests for no public 
purpose*" (Respondent's Memorandum in Opposition to Appellants1 
Motion for Injunction at 16.) The appellees rely on statements 
at the convention that in the framers1 view "the public funds 
that are derived from the taxes of the people ought to be devoted 
strictly to governmental purposes, and it is with a view to 
accomplish that that this Section is proposed . . . •" £d. 
Quoted from Proceedings at 889. And they also rely on assertions 
by the Legislature that the direct equity acquisition, loan, and 
grant features of the Act are for a public purpose. 
That argument serves only to emphasize how squarely the 
challenged money-use features of the DTIA fall within the 
language and the intendment of Section 29. The framers 
manifestly did not intend that the "public purposes" for which 
taxpayers1 money could constitutionally be spent would mean 
anything that the Legislature at any given time determined it to 
mean. If such had been their intent, there would have been no 
need for Article VI, Section 29. The very purpose of Section 29 
was to identify as a matter of constitutional prohibition one 
quite narrow type of expenditure of taxpayers1 money which in the 
framerfs judgment could never qualify as a constitutionally 
acceptable governmental purpose. For reasons set forth in 
Subsection B-l above, if the constitutional history of Section 29 
does not demonstrate this intent to exclude the power of the 
Legislature to spend taxpayer money for private purposes where 
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the Leg i s la ture determines that there i s a publ ic benef i t / i t 
demonstrates nothing at a l l . And the appe l l ees 1 argument to the 
contrary e f f e c t i v e l y asks t h i s Court to ignore the very ex i s tence 
of both the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l language and the h i s tory of i t s 
passage. 
C. This Court's Cases Support the Appellants 
For reasons s ta ted f the f a c t s of t h i s case f a l l 
squarely within the language and in tent of Sect ion 29. Previous 
in t erpre ta t ions of Sect ion 29 are a l so supportive of the language 
of that Sect ion and the c l e a r l y expressed in ten t of those who 
adopted i t . 
This Court's precedents have allowed publ ic 
expenditures only where there was no benef i t to private 
enterpriser or where any such benef i t did not involve putt ing 
public money at risk and was merely inc identa l to dominant public 
e f f e c t s . 1 2 None of those cases involved lending of the s t a t e ' s 
"credit . . . in aid of . . . pr ivate individual or corporate 
e n t e r p r i s e . " 
For example, in upholding the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of the 
Metropolitan Water D i s t r i c t Act, t h i s Court said that i f f after 
1 Z
 The Court has acknowledged that the purpose of Sect ion 29 i s 
to prevent the use of the taxing power of the S ta te to generate 
money to be put at risk for the benef i t of pr ivate en terpr i se . 
Dtah Housing Financing Agency v. Smart, Utah 561 P.2d 1052 f 1056 (1979) ("appropriations to defray o b l i g a t i o n s of the Agency . . . 
would be i n v a l i d as lending the s t a t e ' s c r e d i t " ) ; Utah State Land 
Board v. Utah State Finance Commissionr 12 Utah 2d 265, 266-67 f 
365 P.2d 213/ 214 (1961) (public money not to be invested in a 
"corporation or enterprise des ir ing to s t a r t a bus iness") . 
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its organization, the District in that case should "attempt to 
lend its credit to or subscribe for stock in any of the 
prohibited, private, individual, or corporate enterprises, £Ii£ 
court would stay such prohibited action at the instance of any 
proper party." Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 255, 48 P.2d 
530, 538 (1935) (emphasis supplied). 
This Court has explicitly recognized that use of public 
tax revenues as risk or venture capital was precisely the use 
Section 29 was adopted to prevent. The opinion in Utah State 
Land Board v. Utah State Finance Commission, 12 Utah 2d 265, 365 
P.2d 213 (1961) quoted from David Evans1 statement at the 
Constitutional Convention: 
What is loaning the credit of a state or a 
county or a municipality? In short it means 
that if any corporation or enterprise 
desiring to start a businessr and for the 
purpose of aiding it the State endorses it, 
or rather guarantees the bond or paper of 
such individual or corporation . . . . 
12 Utah 2d at 266-67, 365 P.2d 213 (emphasis supplied) (quoting 
Proceedings at 953). The distinction in Utah State Land Board 
which enabled the Court to uphold the statute was that the 
investments were to be made in "well established" securities in 
the interest of "the prudent handling of [public] funds", not in 
emerging and developing corporations "desiring to start a 
business," where "the element of aiding [the] enterprise is 
present," along with the element of risk. 12 Utah 2d at 267, 365 
P.2d at 214. In that case, therefore, the money was placed in 
securities which not only were secure, but also whose issuer did 
not stand to benefit from the placement since the issuer of "well 
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established corporate securities" — by definition broadly heldf 
highly liquid and exchanged rather than originally issued — 
receive no benefit from the particular placement* By contrast, 
recipients under DTPCfs scheme are unestablished and directly 
benefited by their receipt of the new capitalf and a limited 
partnership interest in a venture fund such as Venture Fund I has 
"no regular resale market," Affidavit of Edward T. Alterf State 
Treasurer, Injunction Hearing of March 17, 1986, Appendix E. 
In all of the cases upholding statutes under which 
appropriations "incidentally benefit" private enterprises, the 
Court has based its findings of constitutionality on the fact 
that the public tax revenues were protected. Public monies were 
not at risk and hence there was no lending of the State1s credit. 
Conversely, the Court has expressly stated that if resort to 
appropriations were legislatively established, the scheme would 
constitute a lending of the state's credit in violation of 
Section 29. £££, e,g,, Utah Housing Finance Agency v» Smartr 
Utah 561 P.2d 1052, 1056 (1979). The DTIA does set up such a 
scheme, and it does violate Section 29. Further, the undisputed 
facts show that the aid to private businesses in this case 
extends beyond being "merely incidental" and is, indeed, the 
direct and only definitely predictable aid and that will occur. 
Section 29 can be construed to permit the State to make 
low-cost financing available to low and moderate income persons 
for the purpose of purchasing homes as this Court held in Utah 
Housing Finance Agency v. Smart, Utah, 561 P.2d 1052, 1055 
(1977); or to authorize the issuance of revenue bonds. Allen v. 
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Tooele County. 21 Utah 2d 383 f 445 P.2d 994 (1968); Tribe Yt Sa l t 
Lake City, Utah, 540 P.2d 499 (1975). But i t s p la in language 
w i l l not permit any scheme in which s t a t e taxpayer money has been 
put a t risk in aid of private en terpr i se . That i s the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d iv id ing l i n e . The opinion in A l l en , for examplef 
noted that the bonds involved there were to be paid only out of 
money derived from the project in connection with which they were 
i s sued . There was therefore , the Court reasonedr no p o s s i b i l i t y 
that those bonds could ever become a debt of the county,1^ In 
jSmaxir the Utah Housing Financing Agency was held to be 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l because i t s authorizing s t a t u t e s p e c i f i c a l l y 
provided that the debts of the agency did not become the debts of 
the S t a t e . 561 P.2d at 10 55. Recently f the e s s e n t i a l elements 
were res ta ted as f o l l o w s : "The county1s cred i t i s not being l e n t 
nor i s i t otherwise at s take. Under the terms of the agreements, 
the Authori ty 's debts are e n t i r e l y i t s own." Municipal Bldg. 
Anth. of Iron County v. Lowder. 23 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 , 15 (1985) . 
The ins tant case , by contrast , c rosses the l i n e that 
t h i s Court has never permitted to be crossed. The s ta tu te at 
i s s u e here permits taxpayers1 money to be put a t r isk in aid of 
new pr ivate ventures . Whether that i s in fact more or l e s s 
des irable in a modern-day judgmental sense than the schemes at 
i ssue in JSmsLLt, A l l en , Txlbe, Lo&felL, or others i s t o t a l l y beside 
1 3
 The Court referred to t h i s as the ' spec ia l funds doctr ine ." 
Al len , 21 Utah 2d at 386, 445 P.2d at 996; Utah Housing Finance 
Agency Yt Smartr Utah, 561 P.2d 1052, 1055 (1977); Tribe v. Sa l t 
Lake City f Utah, 540 P.2d 499, 503-04 (1975) ("obl igat ions of the 
agency . . . not a debt of the [government]" and publ ic funds 
"not being given or loaned to a private person"). 
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the point.14 Neither those cases nor any others have ever 
involved what Section 29 in its narrowest reading prohibits. 
This statute does. 
1 4
 In factr there is good evidence that the Framers1 judgment is 
just as sound today as it was ninety years ago. The fundamental 
problem has not changed. The investment of public money will not 
likely be necessary unless the venture is so speculative that it 
has trouble attracting money from other sources. Thisf in turn, 
reflects the judgment of a free market economy concerning the 
soundness of the investment. As stated by Governor Bangerterf 
the American experience teaches that the best solutions have 
usually been found by "[plrivate citizens who did it on their own 
initiative" and "without reference to any bureaucrat." State of 
the State Message, Utah Senate Journal. 1986 General Session of 
the Forty-Sixth Legislature, January 13, 1986 at 69. 
The financial instability of new ventures was recognized by Mr. 
Evans in the Constitutional Convention as reason to establish 
Section 29, and by the Court in Utah State Land Board as one of 
the bases for its distinction between what it would allow the 
state to invest in ("well established corporate securities") and 
would not allow the state to invest in (emerging and developing, 
corporations "desiring to start a business"). That high-risk 
characteristic of new businesses, and particularly new businesses 
in the high technology field, is reflected in current information 
and experience. First, Venture Fund I's subscription memorandum 
itself identifies its offering as involving a "high degree of 
risk." (R. UTFC action, 470) Of businesses that failed over the 
period 1970 through 1981, 54.8 percent were five years or 
younger, whereas only 20.2 percent were over ten years old. The 
1981 Dnn & Bradstreet Business Failure Record, the Dun & 
Bradstreet Corporation, 1983, p. 11. With regard to high 
technology industries, one study concluded that, "high tech 
industries tend to be volatile at best, and . . . a sorting-out 
of competition occurs quickly compared to less technology-intense 
endeavors." Shanklin & Ryans, Organizing for High-tech 
Marketing. 62 Harvard Business Review, No. 6, 164 (1984). Arthur 
Rock, reported in the Wall Street Journal to have the best track 
record in the venture-capital business over a 25 year period and 
to be a scout for new high-tech talent, is quoted as stating a 
more basic problem: "In all of the electronic technologies now, 
there is nothing radically new happening . . . . [The] major 
productivity increase is over . . . ." The Wall Street Journal. 
December 31, 1985, at 5, Col. 2. According to Seymour Melman, 
professor of industrial engineering at Columbia University, the 
idea that the painful transaction "from smokestack to high 
technology . . . will soon bring the country back to prosperity 
. . .[is] a nice high-tech dream . • • [that] an increasing 
accumulation of evidence suggests . . • won't come true." 
Melman, The High Tech Dream Wonft Come True, Inc., August, 1984 
at 13. 
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This Court's recent dec i s ion in Berry v. Beech 
Aircraf t . 29 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 , (1985) dea l t with another 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provis ion . But the p r i n c i p l e announced in that 
case i s equally appl icable here , and i t requires reversal of the 
D i s t r i c t Court fs judgment: "The plain meaning of the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provis ion cannot be harmonized with the s t a t u t e 
. . . in t h i s case ." Xd. at 1 2 . This Court1s holding and 
rat iona le in Bfirxy, handed down after the D i s t r i c t Court1s 
dec i s ion here f requires reversal of that dec i s i on . The only 
relevant d i f ference i s in the comparative c l a r i t y of the two 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l prov i s ions . 
In short , what B.H. Roberts and h i s co l leagues joined 
together in 1895 f no Legis lature can put asunder in 1985. 
D. A Ruling in Appellants1 Favor on the Section 29 
Issue Will Avoid Additional Constitutional Issues 
I t i s a w e l l - s e t t l e d p r i n c i p l e that courts should avoid 
reaching c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s i f p o s s i b l e . Ashwander v. TVA. 
297 U.S. 288 347 (1936); Malan v. Lewis, Utah, 693 P.2d 661 f 663 
(1984). S imi lar ly , s t a t u t e s should be given an in terpre ta t ion 
which w i l l avoid the neces s i ty of even reaching a cons t i tu t iona l 
i s s u e , so long as such an in terpre ta t ion i s reasonable. N.L.R.B. 
v. Catholic BishQPf 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979); Kennecott Copper 
Corp, v. Salt Lake County, Utah, 702 P.2d 451, 457 (1985). The 
same general principle applies, we submit, to the interpretation 
of constitutional provisions. That is, constitutional provisions 
should be interpreted, if possible, so as to avoid the necessity 
of reaching other constitutional issues. 
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That principle applies in this case* If, as the 
appellees contend. Section 29 could be interpreted to permit the 
venture-equity, loan, and grant features of the UTIA, those 
features would violate other provisions of the Utah Constitution. 
First, the statute would violate Article VI, Section 1, Article 
V, Section 1, and Article I, Section 2, which vest all 
legislative power in the Legislature and ultimately in the 
people, and forbid its delegation to non-governmental entities. 
It would also violate Article XII, Section 1, which prohibits the 
creation of private corporations by a special act. 
1. Delegation of Legislative Powers to Non-Government 
Entities, in the exercise of its statutory authority, UTFC has 
issued a letter of intent to invest public monies in a limited 
partnership, Venture Fund I, the general partner of which is 
Impetus, Inc., a corporation. Both Venture Fund I and Impetus, 
Inc. are private, profit-making entities. They are not public 
bodies. They have no governmental status. Yet the UTIA gives 
them the most potent of all governmental prerogatives: the power 
to spend public money. 
If the constitutional assurances that legislative power 
is vested in the Legislature and is not to be delegated outside 
government mean anything at all, they must prohibit what has 
happened in this case. Under the UTIA the power to decide how 
public money is to be spent is vested totally in private persons 
who have no governmental status and no governmental 
responsibility other than spending the taxpayers1 money. The 
only legislative involvement in the selection of the entities who 
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are to receive public money through DTFC is the requirement that 
they be "emerging and developing small businesses." (U.C.A.f 
1953, § 63-60-4(2)(c) (Supp. 1985). There is nothing in the 
statute that would prevent OTFC from favoring an applicant who is 
a friend or business associate of one of the board members. No 
limit is set on the frequency or dollar amount of awards that can 
be granted to any given person. Moreover, UTFC was exempted by 
S.B. No. 1 from many of the usual state controls (U.C.A.f 1953, 
§ 63-60-6 (Supp. 1985)), and was exempted further by amendment in 
the 1986 General Session from the Utah Procurement Code, which 
requires competitive bidding in purchasing and in the choosing of 
agents such as program administrators and lawyers. S.B. No. 254. 
The power ultimately to decide how the money is to be 
spent rests in the unfettered discretion of the directors of 
Impetus, Inc., who are three times removed from the people by the 
insulating layers of Venture Fund I, UTFC, and the Legislature. 
This power cannot not be squared with the cited constitutional 
provisions as construed by this Court. Salt Lake City 
Firefighters v, I.A, of Firefighters, Utah, 563 p.2d 786 (1977); 
State v. Gallion. Utah 572 P.2d 683 (1977); Revne v. Trade 
£amm!jL., 113 Utah 155, 192 p.2d 563 (1948); Tite v, State Tax 
Comm'n.. 89 Utah 404, 57 P.2d 734 (1936); Western Leather & 
Finding Co, v, State Tax CQmmfn., 87 Utah 227, 48 p.2d 526 
(1935). 
2. Special Acts Creating Private Corporations. If the 
UTFC and the business entities to which it proposes to transfer 
public moneys are free of the constitutional constraints on 
-29-
publicf Executive agencies prescribed by Section 29r then the 
DTFC must be deemed to be a private corporation/ created by 
special act in violation of Article XIIf Section 1. £££/ Oregon 
Railway and Navigation Company v. Qregonian Railway Company/ 130 
u.s, 1 (1889); Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company v> Utah 
Insurance Guaranty Association. Utah/ 564 P.2d 751/ 754 (1977); 
State Vt KallaSr 97 Utah 492f 505f 94 P.2d 414f 420 (1939); 
Nelson v. McArthurr 38 Mich. 204f 207 (1878); Oregon Cascade 
Railroad Company v. Bailey. 3 Ore. 164/ 172/ (1869). 
Fortunately/ neither of these issues need be reached here because 
it is so clear that the framers of the Utah Constitution 
expressly prohibited putting taxpayer money at risk in aid of 
private businesses. 
E. The Legislature's Objectives Can Be Achieved 
Through Alternative Means That Are Clearly 
Constitutional 
In several contexts/ the existence of other 
al ternatives/ less burdensome to constitutional valuesf i s 
relevant to the consti tut ionali ty of the particular practice at 
issue. This principle has been applied/ for example/ to s ta te -
imposed burdens on in ters ta te commerce preferential to the 
cit izens of the imposing s t a t e f 1 5 to s ta te renunciations of their 
own obligations in violation of the contracts clause/*** and to a 
variety of First Amendment cases.1 7 
1 5
 Hughes v. Oklahoma. 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
1 6
 United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. l (1977). 
17
 E.g. , Gibson v. Florida Legislative Committee, 372 U.S. 539 
(1963) . 
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The a v a i l a b i l i t y to the Leg is la ture of other 
a l t e r n a t i v e s which do not ra i se c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ques t ions i s most 
c l e a r l y appropriate, we submit, in a case such as t h i s one, where 
the Const i tut ion speaks with such prec i s ion and c l a r i t y f and 
where the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l h i s tory leaves no doubt concerning the 
framers1 i n t e n t . 
There are several c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y permiss ible ways 
that the S ta te Legis lature can spend publ ic money — and do so in 
ways that in fact confer some economic bene f i t s on Utah fs 
c i t i z e n s — without running afoul of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
prohib i t ion against placing taxpayer money at risk in aid of 
pr ivate en terpr i s e . Indeed f the Legis lature authorized some of 
these a l t e r n a t i v e s in the DTIA i t s e l f , and s ince they are 
severable from the private venture-equi ty , loan and grant 
prov is ions of the Act, they are v a l i d . 
For example, DTPC has provided $300,000 to the publ i c , 
non-prof i t , broad-based, educational and coordinating e n t i t y , the 
Utah Innovation Foundation. (R. UTFC a c t i o n , 311) That i s not a 
lending of the S t a t e 1 s cred i t in a id of pr ivate enterpr i se . The 
Legis la ture may authorize the expenditure of State money in 
publ ic , non-profit research and development programs, such as 
those at U n i v e r s i t i e s . I t may d irec t publ ic moneys to broad-
based adver t i s ing , promoting, and otherwise a t t rac t ing cer ta in 
types of bus inesses to Utah. The Legis la ture may a lso (so long 
as i t observes other cons t i tu t iona l l i m i t a t i o n s ) create favorable 
tax advantages, or provide spec ia l f inancing dev ices , such as 
indus tr ia l revenue bonds. 
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Whether it was a good idea or not to bar use of public 
money in aid of private enterprise is not a relevant issue for 
this Court nor for the Legislature. It is an issue that can be 
resolved only through the constitution-making process. In 1895 
the Constitution Makers (the Framers) considered it a close 
question. In 1974f the Constitution Makers (the Voters) 
considered it not a close question. Until those judgments are 
reversed by the people of the State of Utah, the State cannot use 
its money to make direct equity acquisitionsf loansf or gifts in 
direct aid of private, start-up businesses. If there are 
legitimate governmental objectives which the Legislature wants to 
accomplish it will have to look to alternative ways to accomplish 
those objectives. Fortunately for the Legislature, there are 
alternative ways. 
II. 
UNDER ARTICLE VIIf SECTION 16 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS THE 
EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO REPRESENT UTFC 
Article VII, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
The Attorney General shall be the legal adviser 
of the State officers, except as otherwise 
provided by this Constitution and shall 
perform such other duties as provided by law. ° 
X b
 A Utah statute, U.C.A.f 1953f § 67-5-3 (Supp. 1985) 
implements this constitutional mandate through its grant 
of powers to the Attorney General to perform "legal 
services for any agency of state government." The 
statute further provides that "MAlgency1 means any 
department, division, agencyf commissionr boardf councilf 
committeef authority, institutionf or other entity within 
the state government of Utah." Xd. 
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The determinative issue is whether the appellees are 
"state officers" within the meaning of Article VII, Section 16. 
This Court1s decision in Hansen v. Dtah State Retirement Board. 
Utah, 652 P.2d 1332 (1982) interpreted Section 16 to confer 
constitutional authority on the Attorney General to be the legal 
advisor to the Executive department officers over which the 
Executive officers referred to in Article VII have supervisory 
control. It also identified state funding as an indicator that 
the state-funded entity was an Executive agency for which the 
Attorney General was directed to be legal counsel. Thus, the 
principal relevant inquiries under Hansen are whether the entity 
at issue receives substantial state funding, and whether its 
officers are subject to the power of appointment and control of 
Article VII-Executive officers.1^ 
The District Court correctly recognized that DTPC 
receives substantial state appropriations, and is an agency 
within the Executive Branch. Those correct premises require the 
conclusion that the Attorney General is UTFCfs constitutionally 
designated counsel. The District Court erred by ruling that 
though DTPC is within the Executive Branch it is nonetheless 
"independent" and therefore not subject to the requirements of 
Article VII, Section 16. That ruling flies in the face of the 
Constitution as well as case law. 
in Hansen v> Utah State Retirement Board, Utah, 652 
P.2d 1332, 1334 (1982), the issue was "the meaning of the 
19 These Article VII officers include the Governor, the State 
Treasurer and the State Auditor. 652 P.2d at 1337. 
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term f State officers1 as used in Article VII, §16." The 
defendants in Hansenf each of which had specific statutory 
authorization to hire independent legal counsel, were: The Utah 
State Retirement Board, the Utah State Industrial Commission, the 
Utah State Insurance Fund and the University of Utah Medical 
Center Trust Fund. After analyzing the constitutional language 
as well as the nature and history of the office of Attorney 
General, the Court concluded as f o l l o w s : 
[Tlhe framers intended to confer 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l power on the Attorney General 
only with respect to execut ive department 
o f f i c e s . Thus, the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l authority 
of the Attorney General i s to act as l e g a l 
adviser to the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l execut ive 
o f f i c e r s referred to in A r t i c l e VII, i . e . , 
the Governor, Lt. Governor, Auditor, 
Treasurer, and the Superintendent of Public 
Ins truct ion [,and] the departments over which 
they have supervisory control . . . • 
652 P.2d at 1336-37 (Firs t emphasis in o r i g i n a l ; second emphasis 
suppl ied) • 
In deciding whether the defendants in Hansen were part 
of the Executive Department and hence the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c l i e n t s 
of the Attorney General, t h i s Court looked primarily at who 
contro l l ed the "agency" and whether i t r e l i e d upon or spent s t a t e 
funds, i d - at 13 38-40. The Court concluded that each of the 
defendants was outs ide the Executive Branch. The Court's 
r a t i o n a l e , which contro l s t h i s case , was that A r t i c l e VII , 
Sect ion 16 was inappl icable because none of the e n t i t i e s in 
Hansen was within the supervisory control of A r t i c l e V l l - S t a t e 
officers and none relied significantly upon state-appropriated 
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funds for its support. u 
The Utah Constitution as interpreted by Han serif 
requires that the Attorney General be DTFC's legal counsel. DTFC 
receives and relies entirely or almost entirely upon the large 
amounts of public money that have been appropriated to it. To 
the extent they existf supervisory controls over DTFC reside 
essentially in the officers of the Executive Branchf and most 
notably the Governor. 
The Governor appoints all the Trustee-board members. 
D.C.A., 1953, § 63-60-4(3) (Supp. 1985). One member of the 
Governor's office and one member of the Department of Community 
and Economic Development — an Executive agency — are ex officio 
members of the board. DNDISPDTED FACTS, Appendix Df Paragraph 
20. DTFC is required to make an annual report to the Governor. 
O.C.A., 1953, § 63-60-5(7) (Supp. 1985) .21 It is subject to 
annual audit by the State Auditor (D.C.A., 1953f § 63-60-5(7) 
(Supp. 1985) , and has been required to submit its public funds to 
the custody of the State Treasurer. 
Z{)
 Utah State Retirement Board; "No state funds are appropriated 
to meet any administrative costs." 652 P.2d at 1338. Industrial 
Commission/Insurance Fund: "All administrative costs of the Fund 
are borne by the Fund itselff including attorneys fees"; "[Tlhere 
is 'a special fund separate and apart from all public moneys or 
funds of this state1". 652 P.2d at 1339. University of Utah 
Medical Center Trust Fund; "The Fund is financed solely from a 
portion of patient care revenues." 652 P.2d at 1340. 
21
 DTFC has been exempted from many of the usual state controls. 
But it is not exempt from the Dtah State personnel system for 
which the Legislature has directed that "the governor be 
responsible." D.C.A., § 67-19-2(1) (Supp. 1985). The 1985 
Special Session expressly deleted DTFCfs originally proposed 
exemption from the statute that governs that system. (R. DTFC 
actionf 490) 
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The agency has no judicial or proper legislative 
functions nor any rule-making power. Rather, its stated purpose 
of economic development in Utah is historically an Executive 
prerogative, and an objective of the present Executive 
administration. By a simple process of elimination and the 
application of common sense, DTFC must be viewed as part of the 
Executive branch of government and not a part of either of the 
other two branches. Despite any contrary assertions that DTFC is 
"independent," its reliance on state financing and its other 
executive characteristics identify UTFC as an agency within the 
Executive Branch, and the District Court correctly so concluded. 
As such, its lawyer is constitutionally established to be the 
Attorney General. 
The wisdom of the Constitution makers1 judgment that 
the Attorney General should have the exclusive right to provide 
legal representation for state officers is well demonstrated by 
what has happened in this case. Spreading representational 
authority among state officers invites the kind of inconsistent 
advice that led the Legislature to enact S.B. No. 1. It also 
invites the filing of lawsuits such as the one filed by UTFC 
which has two defects that are relevant to the present 
discussion. First, for reasons stated below, UTFCfs suit clearly 
does not meet the standards for a justiciable controversy as 
declared by this Court. Second, because the UTFC suit usurps a 
function that belongs exclusively to the Attorney General, it is 
necessarily based on allegations of speculation concerning 
actions that the Attorney General plans to take. 
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The Court has held t h a t in order to es tab l i sh 
j u s t i c i a b i l i t y in an act ion for declaratory judgment, the 
p l a i n t i f f must show the presence of an " invar iable j u s t i c i a b l e 
controversy" (also referred to by the Court as an "actual 
controversy") and t h a t a "mere general contention between pa r t i e s 
tha t has not been formulated in a def in i te controversy" i s not 
enough. Baird v. S t a t e , Utahf 574 P.2d 713f 716 (1978). ££& 
.alas, Harris v, Springville City, 27 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (1986); 
Kennecott Corp.. v. Sal t Lake County, Utah 702 P.2d 451 (1985). 
The complaint f i l ed by UTPC f a l l s far short of that standard. I t 
contains such a l l ega t ions as t ha t the Attorney General " i s 
charged with the r e spons ib i l i ty" (R. UTFC act ion f 2-10f Paragraph 
3) ; t h a t he has "threatened to sue" (Id- Paragraphs 5 and 12); 
tha t he has "expressed the view" (Xd* Paragraph 12) ; and tha t he 
has issued "public statements and advice" and created a cer ta in 
alleged "cl imate". (Xd. Paragraph 13). 
By these statements, the complaint impl ic i t ly 
acknowledges tha t the crucia l issue concerns the Attorney 
General ' s pos i t ion and what he intends to do about i t . The 
Attorney General should be allowed to s t a t e for himself what h is 
posi t ion i s ra ther than have a potent ia l adversary s t a t e i t for 
him. 
Under the standards s ta ted by t h i s Court, the complaint 
f i l ed by UTFC i s not j u s t i c i a b l e , and would have to be dismissed 
for tha t reason alone. In h i s Memorandum Decision the D i s t r i c t 
Court appears belatedly to have recognized tha t the pa r t i e s and 
issues involved were properly before him only on the basis of the 
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complaint of the Attorney General and State Treasurer. That 
Decision ruled only in the action brought by these appellants/ 
and ident i f ied the Attorney General and State Treasurer as 
p l a i n t i f f s and DTFC and i t s Trustees as defendants. Memorandum 
Decision, Appendix C at 1 . As the Court stated in Jenkins v. 
JSKflUr 675 P.2d 1145, 1151 (Dtah 1983) , "this Court may not issue 
an advisory opinion on [a] question merely to rel ieve . . . 
discomfort. • 
Fortunately, the Court need not reach the 
j u s t i c i a b i l i t y of the DTFC's suit because the substantive issues 
concerning the const i tut ional i ty of the DTIAfs venture-capital 
scheme are properly before the Court in the sui t properly brought 
by the Attorney General. The very existence of that clearly non-
jus t i c iab le s u i t , however, i l l u s t r a t e s the mischief that can 
result from departing from the constitutional requirement that 
the legal representation of Executive state agencies be invested 
in the State 1 s const i tut ional ly designated law off icer , rather 
than splintered among whatever lawyers those agencies might 
s e l ec t . 
The performance of the Attorney General's 
constitutional respons ib i l i t i e s should not be complicated by 
periodical ly permitting s tate agencies to hire outside counsel 
whose primary responsibi l i ty runs not to the precepts of the Dtah 
Constitution, but rather to their c l i en t s , who pay their fees . A 
heavy and an unnecessary burden would f a l l upon the orderly 
workings of s tate government i f any s tate agency which disagreed 
with the Attorney General's advice or opinion were held to have 
the constitutional authority and standing to hire a lawyer and 
sue him.^2 
Moreover, when the issue proceeds to litigation, as it 
has here, the orderly functioning of the Judicial Branch is also 
at stake. The reason is that unless representational authority 
is limited to the Attorney General, the courts will have to 
consider different advocates, each purporting to speak for the 
State, but each taking a different position. 
The litigant that appears with greatest frequency 
before the Utah courts is the State of Utah. Accordingly, when 
the State of Otah appears before this Court or any other court of 
this State, more is involved than the simple resolution of a 
legal dispute. Two separate branches of government are 
performing their constitutionally designated governmental 
responsibilities: the Executive branch in bringing the States1 
cases to court, and the Judicial Branch in deciding those cases. 
When that happens, the Judicial Branch has the right to expect 
LA
 In recognition of such practical realities, various Utah 
statutes grant controlling representational authority to the 
Attorney General. For example, under U.C.A., 1953, § 67-5-1 
(Supp. 1985) it "is the duty of the attorney general [to have] 
the charge, as attorney, of all civil legal matters in which the 
state is in anywise interested." Under § 67-5-1(12), it is the 
duty of the attorney general to "institute and prosecute proper 
proceedings in any court . . . to restrain and enjoin 
corporations . . . from acting illegally or in excess of their 
corporate powers"; under U.C.A., 1953, § 52-4-9 (1981) the 
"attorney general . . . shall enforce [the] chapter" requiring 
open and public meetings of public bodies. Moreover, the Court 
has recognized the right, if not duty, of the Attorney General to 
bring suits to clarify constitutional issues. Hansen v. Barlowf 
23 Utah 2d 47, 53, 456 P.2d 177, 181 (1969). £&& Alfifi, Feeney v. 
Commonwealth, 373 Mass. 359, 366 N.E. 2d 1262 (1977). 
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that the Executive Branch will speak with one consistent voice so 
that the courts can rely on one source as the advocate for State 
policy. This can be achieved only by faithful adherence to the 
constitutional principle vesting in the Attorney General the 
exclusive right to represent Executive state agencies. 
CONCLUSION 
The Constitution of Utah, framed to protect the 
interests of all Utahns, controls in this case. Previous to its 
adoption, the Framers undoubtedly had become acquainted with 
pressures that typically are applied against lawmakers by 
advocates of various private interests, such as railroads and 
sugar factories, to obtain money from the public till. One can 
be sure that such advocates argued that their particular private 
business projects were supported by essential public purposes, 
and that they should not be fettered by controls. Now, high 
technology development is advanced as justification for the 
discretionary award of public money, in aid of private, 
speculative, business ventures of a very narrow class. It is 
just such use of public money for private purposes that the 
Constitution was framed to prevent. 
Under the Utah Constitution the Attorney General is the 
exclusive legal representative of UTFC and its officers. This 
result follows because UTFC is an agency within the Executive 
Branch and is financed by state-appropriated moneys, and because 
this result serves the public interest. 
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As in Rampton v . Barlow. 23 Utah 2d 383 f 3 9 1 , 464, P.2d 
378, 383 (Utah 1970) , "the s t a t u t e a t t e m p t s t o go beyond the 
power g ran ted t o t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . " Accord. Berry v. Beech 
A i r c r a f t C o r p . , 29 Adv. Rep. 3 (1985) ; Matheson v, Fe r ry , 641 
P.2d 674, 679-80 (1982) . 
The Attorney General i s e n t i t l e d t o r e v e r s a l of t he 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s judgment on the f o u r t h and seventh causes of 
a c t i o n of h i s F i r s t Amended Complaint , i s e n t i t l e d t o judgment i n 
h i s favor on those causes of a c t i o n , and i s e n t i t l e d t o d i smi s sa l 
of UTFC's Complaint. 
DATED t h i s T day of A p r i l , 1986. u  r 
REX 'E. LEE 
Specia l A s s i s t a n t Attorney 
General 
RALPH L.vFINLAYSON 
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General 
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APPENDIX A 
Utah Technology and Innovation Act. 
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION ACT 63-60-3 
the application of any provision to any per- Effective Date. 
son or circumstance is held invalid, the Section 19 of Laws 1982 (3rd S.S.), ch. 7 
remainder shall not be affected thereby/* provided: "This act shall take effect upon 
approval." Approved January 4,1983. 
CHAPTER 60 
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION ACT 
Compiler's Notes. 
Section 11 of Laws 1985 (1st S.S.), ch. 5 provides: "The Utah Technology [and] Innovation 
Act is repealed June 30,1989." 
Section 
63-60-1. Short title. 
63-60-2. Definitions. 
63-60-3. Legislative declarations — Purpose of chapter. 
63-60-4. Utah Technology Finance Corporation created — Non-profit corporation — Power 
and authority — Board of trustees to govern corporation — Appointment of mem-
bers by governor — Rulemaking authority — Employees — Legal counsel — 
Advisory board. 
63-60-5. Criteria governing operations of corporation — Annual report — Audit by state 
auditor. 
63-60-6. Corporation exempted from certain acts. 
63-60-1. Short title. This chapter [shaH be] is known [tmd may be erted] as the 
encouragement of economic growth and 
improvements within the state of Utah of 
technological and innovative business, com-
mercial and industrial activities with the 
intention of broadening the economic base 
within the state and encouraging the cre-
ation of jobs for residents of the state. — 
Laws 1983, ch. 311. 
63-60-2. Definitions. As used in this chapter "small business" means small 
business as defined by the United States Small Business Administration, and "cor-
poration" means the Utah technology finance corporation provided for in this chap-
ter. 
History: L. 1983, ch. 311, §2. 
63-60-3. Legislative declarations — Purpose of chapter. (1) The Utah Legis-
lature finds and declares that: 
(a) the development of innovative and high technology business in Utah is nec-
essary to insure progress and increasing productivity in the fields of agriculture, 
health, safety, protection of the environment, transportation, communication, edu-
cation, manufacturing, and services in this state; 
(b) small and emerging businesses have a substantially greater rate of innova-
tion and development in high technology than large and mature businesses; 
(c) small and emerging businesses create new employment opportunities at a 
substantially greater rate than large and mature businesses; 
(d) available sources of assistance and capital in this state are inadequate to 
assure necessary development of small and emerging businesses involved in innova-
tion and high technology; 
"Utah Technology and Innovation Act." 
History: L. 1983, ch. 311, § 1; 1985 (1st 
S.S.),ch.5, §6. 
Title of Act. 
An act relating to state affairs in general; 
creating the Utah technology finance corpo-
ration; and granting authority to the corpo-
ration for the contracting of, dealing in and 
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(e) other states and municipalities of other states have programs of governmen-
tal aid and promotion to attract and foster innovative and high technology busi-
ness; and 
(f) the fostering and development of innovative and high technology business 
in this state is necessary to assure the welfare of its citizens, the growth of its 
economy, adequate employment for its citizens, and progress in the fields stated 
in Subsection (a). 
(2) It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to provide a means to encourage 
and foster innovation and the development of high technology, the welfare of citi-
zens in this state, economic growth, adequate employment, and progress in the 
fields stated in Subsection (l)(a) by assisting and participating in (a) the organiza-
tion, capital formation, management, growth, development, and disposition of small 
and emerging businesses, including start-up and early-stage businesses, involved 
in innovation and high technology, and (b) the protection, use, exploitation, licens-
ing, and disposition or rights in the technology that they produce, all for the bene-
fit of the citizens of Utah. 
History: C. 1953, 63-60-3, enacted by L. Compiler's Notes. 
1985 (1st S.S.), ch. 5, § 7. LaWS 19g5 ( l s t s.S.), ch. 5, § 7 repealed old 
section 63-60-3 (L. 1983, ch. 311, § 3), relating 
to establishment of the Technology Finance 
Corporation, and enacted new section 63-60-3. 
63-60-4. Utah Technology Finance Corporation created — Non-profit cor-
poration — Powers and authority — Board of trustees to govern corporation 
— Appointment of members by governor — Rulemaking authority — Employ-
ees — Legal counsel — Advisory board. (1) There is created an independent pub-
lic corporation known as the "Utah Technology Finance Corporation." 
(2) The corporation shall be established as a non-profit corporation. Articles 
of incorporation shall be filed for the corporation with the lieutenant governor. 
The corporation shall, subject to this chapter, have all powers and authority per-
mitted non-profit corporations by law, including but not limited to the power and 
authority: 
(a) to take all action necessary or desirable to encourage and assist in the 
research, development, promotion, and growth of emerging and developing techno-
logical and innovative small businesses throughout Utah; 
(b) to establish separate funds and accounts into which may be deposited any 
state appropriations, public moneys, or other moneys made available to the corpo-
ration from any governmental agency, or any institution, person, firm, or corpora-
tion, public or private, and to use these funds for any of the purposes of the 
corporation established by this chapter; 
(c) to provide from its funds matching sources of capital for equity investment 
in or direct loans to emerging and developing technological and innovative small 
businesses in accordance with this chapter; 
(d) to coordinate and cooperate with state agencies and the state's political sub-
divisions, colleges, universities, and other academic and research sources, both pri-
vate and public, agencies and entities of the United States government, and all 
other public or private entities; 
(e) to negotiate, contract for, obtain, hold, own, grant, and otherwise dispose 
of, to or from individuals and public and private entities, ownership, title, rights, 
exclusive and non-exclusive licenses, and other interests in and to any of the follow-
ing insofar as related to developments or businesses encouraged, established, or 
fostered through the efforts, contacts, money, or other resources of the corporation: 
(i) stock, partnership interests, and other ownership and equity interests in compa-
nies and projects; (ii) proprietary rights of any nature, including without limitation 
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patent rights, copyrights, rights in mask works, trade secrets, know-how, and 
trademarks; and (iii) royalties, license fees, and other similar payments; 
(f) to make arrangements with various businesses and technological develop-
ment companies for additional sources of funding and with federal, state, and other 
governmental entities, as well as private and public foundations, and other donors 
for sources of grants to assist the corporation and other corporations, small busi-
nesses, and high technology projects to obtain the necessary capital and other 
assistance to accomplish the purposes of this chapter; 
(g) to invest and reinvest its funds for the purposes provided in this chapter; 
(h) to expend its money for the operation of the corporation and its purposes; 
(i) to contract with public and private entities and agencies, individuals, and 
companies, for the carrying on of the activities and powers provided in this chapter, 
including the granting of research contracts; 
(j) to receive appropriations from the Legislature and other public moneys, as 
well as contributions from other public agencies, private individuals, companies, 
and other donors and contributors; and 
(k) to seek federal and state tax exemptions, and to take all related actions, 
as determined by the board of trustees of the corporation. 
(3) The corporation shall be governed by a board of trustees consisting of at 
least seven but no more than eleven trustees appointed for staggered three-year 
terms and consisting of the following: 
(a) a member of, the Utah State Senate, appointed by the governor; 
(b) a Member of the Utah State House of Representatives, appointed by the 
governor; and 
(c) the remaining trustees appointed by the governor with the consent of the 
Senate, selected from representatives of the business, banking and finance, venture 
capital, engineering, scientific, academic, legal, and accounting communities and 
from the general public. 
(4) The corporation may: 
(a) adopt bylaws and rules and exercise all other powers permitted under the 
laws of Utah not in conflict with this chapter; 
(b) hire a full-time director and all other employees which the trustees deter-
mine necessary for the conduct of the business of the corporation, and compensate 
the director and the other employees from the funds of the corporation or from 
other resources available to the corporation; 
(c) hire and retain independent legal counsel; and 
(d) establish an advisory board consisting of persons experienced and 
knowledgeable in science, business, banking, law, government, academics, and 
accounting, and consisting of others whom the board of trustees deems desirable 
to assist in the accomplishment of the purposes of this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 63-60-4, enacted by L. Compiler's Notes. 
1985 (1st S.S.), ch. 5, § 8. LaWS i985 ( lB t s.S.), ch. 5, § 8, repealed old 
section 63-60-4 (L. 1983, ch 311, §4) relating 
to the board of trustees, and enacted new 
section 63-60-4. 
63-60-5. Criteria governing operations of corporation — Annual report — 
Audit by state auditor. The corporation, in connection with its operations and 
duties, shall comply with the following criteria: 
(1) If the corporation provides money to high technology small businesses or 
projects in Utah [m the form of research contracts, unless otherwise determined 
by the board of trustees, royaHy] provision shall be made for payments [sfcaH be 
retained €HW! provision made for ultimate] to the corporation related to the com-
mercial value of the results of use of the corporation's money, in the form of royal-
ties or otherwise, or for retention by^  the corporation of equity, whether upon 
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conversion 01 iall Fights fto ficQuiPcd into CQuity vti Che high technology small fousi-
ttess or project;] the right to such payment or otherwise. 
(2) If the corporation provides money for direct capital investment in high tech-
nology small businesses or projects, the corporation shall require, as a condition 
thereof, matching funds from private sources in amounts at least equal to the 
money invested by the corporation!*]. 
(3) pFhe] Any proprietary [t4ghts tmd interests] right, interest, or both, of the 
corporation in such high technology small businesses and projects shall remain a 
non-controlling minority interest^]. 
(4) The corporation shall, by written contract, ensure that it is given regular 
status reports on the use of the money it has invested or loaned or research con-
tracts it has awarded to high technology small businesses, and projects and on the 
status of the small business or project in which it has become so involved[t]. 
(5) The assistance and investment by the corporation in high technology busi-
nesses and projects is limited to those small businesses and projects having their 
primary place of business and projects, as well as their primary business opera-
tions, within Utah[t ttnd\ 
(6) The corporation [sh*H encourage^ in encouraging the development and 
growth of businesses and technology [whkh wt tret detrimental te], shall consider 
effects on the quality of the land, air, water, or general environment of Utah. 
(7) The corporation shall, following the close of each fiscal year, submit an 
annual report of its activities for the preceding year to the governor and the Legis-
lature. Each report shall set forth a complete operating report and audited finan-
cial statement of the corporation during the fiscal year it covers. The state auditor 
shall at least once in each year audit the books and accounts of the corporation 
or he shall contract with a nationally recognized independent certified public 
accountant for this audit. The corporation shall reimburse the state auditor from 
available monies of the corporation for the actual and necessary costs of that audit. 
A copy of the audit of the independent CPA shall be submitted for review to the 
state auditor within 90 days after the end of the fiscal year covered by the audit. 
History: L. 1983, ch. 311, §5; 1985 (1st 
S.S.),ch.5,§9. 
63-60-6. Corporation exempted from certain acts. The corporation is exempt 
from: 
(1) Chapter 7, Title 51, the State Money Management Act; 
(2) Chapter 5, Title 51, the Funds Consolidation Act; 
(3) Chapter 1, Title 63, the Administrative Services Act; and 
(4) Chapter 38, Title 63, the Budgetary Procedures Act. 
Amends: 51-7-4, 51-7-11, 63-60-1, 63-60-5. 
Enacts: 51-5-4.5, 63-1-10.5, 63-38-9.5, 
63-60-6. 
Repeals and reenacts: 63-60-3, 63-60-4. 
Effective Date. 
Section 12 of Laws 1985 (1st S.S.), ch. 5 
provided: "This act takes effect upon 
approval by the governor, or the day follow-
ing the constitutional time limit of Article 
VII, Sec. 8 without the governor's signature, 
or in the case of a veto, the date of veto over-
ride." Approved July 16,1985. 
History: C. 1953, 63-60-6, enacted by L, 
1985 (1st S.S.), ch. 5, § 10. 
Title of Act. 
An act relating to the Utah Technology 
and Innovation Act; exempting the Utah 
Technology Finance Corporation from the 
Funds Consolidation Act, the State Money 
Management Act, the Administrative Ser-
vices Act, and the Budgetary Procedures Act; 
clarifying the authority and functions of the 
corporation; providing for repeal of the act; 
and providing an effective date. — Laws 1985 
(1st S.S.), ch. 5. 
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Venture Fund I Subscription-Memorandum-
Facing Page. 
CONFIDENTIAL PRIVATE PLACEMENT MEMORANDUM 
UTAH TECHNOLOGY VENTURE FUND I 
(A Utah Limited Partnership to be formed) 
300 Limited Partnership Units ($15,000,000) 
$50,000 Per Unit 
Minimum Subscription: 2 Units (1) 
THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP UNITS (THE "UNITS") OFFERED 
HEREBY HAVE NOT BEEN REGISTERED UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 
1933, AS AMENDED (THE "SECURITIES ACT"), AND ARE BEING OFFERED 
AND SOLD IN RELIANCE UPON EXEMPTIONS FROM THE REGISTRATION 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE SECURITIES ACT. SUCH UNITS HAVE NOT BEEN 
APPROVED OR DISAPPROVED BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, ANY STATE SECURITIES COMMISSION OR OTHER REGULATORY 
AUTHORITY, NOR HAVE ANY OF THE FOREGOING AUTHORITIES PASSED 
UPON THE MERITS OF THIS OFFERING OR THE ACCURACY CR ADEQUACY OF 
THIS CONFIDENTIAL PRIVATE PLACEMENT MEMORANDUM. ANY 
REPRESENTATION TO THE CONTRARY IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE. 
AN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITS INVOLVES A HIGH DEGREE OF 
RISK AND IS SUITABLE ONLY FOR INVESTORS OF SUBSTANTIAL MEANS 
WHO HAVE NO NEED FOR LIQUIDITY IN THEIR INVESTMENTS. (SEE 
"INVESTOR SUITABILITY STANDARDS" AND "RISK FACTORS".) SUCH 
RISKS INCLUDE RISKS RESULTING FROM THE FACT THAT THE BUSINESS 
TO BE ENGAGED IN BY THE PARTNERSHIP WILL BE WITHIN CERTAIN 
BROAD GUIDELINES, IN THE SOLE DISCRETION OF THE GENERAL 
PARTNER. SEE "PROPOSED ACTIVITIES" AND "MANAGEMENT". 
RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED ON THE TRANSFERABILITY OF THE UNITS 
AND PURCHASERS THEREOF MUST BEAR THE ECONOMIC RISK OF THEIR 
INVESTMENT FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME. 
General Partner: 
Impetus, Inc. 
419 Wakara Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
(801) 582-1482 
November 15, 1984 
Prospective Investor: 
Copy No. 
APPENDIX C 
Memorandum Decision of the Third District Court. 
S?.\ L:^3 CC^HLV Uiah 
DEC 2C1955 
H. Dix/r, ! ' . . rel ief: .vk o;d/cist. Court 
By f^r , ; -*rv - ^ ^ v _ _ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DfsMPftfM 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID L. WILKINSON, 
Attorney General for the State 
of Utah, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UTAH TECHNOLOGY FINANCE 
CORPORATION, and its Board of 
Trustees, namely SYDNEY J. 
GREEN, EUGENE OVERFELT, KEITH 
WHISENANT, WILLARD H. GARDINER, 
JAMES JARDINE, WARREN E. PUGH, 
and KARL N. SNOW, JR., and 
John Does I-X, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-85-5885 
In 1983 the Utah Legislature enacted Utah Code Ann., Section 
63-60-1, et seq. (hereinafter "the Act"), and created the Utah 
Technology Finance Corporation (hereinafter "UTFC"). 
The Act established UTFC as an "independent public corporation" 
with a board of trustees appointed for three year terms by the 
Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate. It was 
given authority to retain independent legal counsel, and establish 
separate accounts into which its funds could be deposited. 
It was empowered, among other things, to invest in or loan money 
to emerging "high tech" businesses. The purpose of this, according 
to the legislative findings, is to encourage "progress and increasing 
productivity" within the state of Utah, and to "create new employment 
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opportunities.11 The legislature appropriated $1.2 million to 
UTFC for fiscal year 1984-85, and $2.0 million for fiscal year 
1985-86. 
UTFC has proceeded to exercise its statutory authority 
by committing to make a substantial investment of public funds 
in a limited partnership called Venture Fund I. UTFC has retained 
independent legal counsel and deposited its appropriated funds 
into a commercial bank. 
UTFC has filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a 
declaration that the Act is constitutional. The Attorney General 
and the Utah State Treasurer have also filed an action seeking 
a converse declaration. The two lawsuits have been consolidated# 
and both sides have moved for Summary Judgment. 
The Attorney General argues that the Act violates Article 
VI, Section 29; Article V# Section 1; and Article VI# Section 
1 of the Utah Constitution. The Treasurer takes the position 
that the authorization of UTFC to deposit its funds into a commercial 
bank is a violation of Article VII, Section 15. The Attorney 
General also takes the position that the authorization of UTFC 
to hire independent counsel is a violation of Article VII, Section 
16. Finally, the Attorney General argues that UTFC must comply 
with the Utah Open and Public Meetings Law; that the appropriation 
for fiscal year 1984-85 lapsed, not having been expended at 
the end of that fiscal year, and is returnable to the State 
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Mineral Lease Fund; and that the title of Senate Bill No. 1, 
which amended the statute in 1985 was not sufficiently clear, 
and the statute is therefore unconstitutional on that basis. 
In the alternative the Attorney General argues if UTFC is not 
a public entity, then the Act is unconstitutional as a violation 
of Article XII, Section 1. 
I. ARTICLE VI, SECTION 29 - INVESTMENT IN PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
Article VI, Section 29, provides: 
The Legislature shall not authorize the 
State, or any county, city, town, township, 
district or other political subdivision 
of the State to lend its credit or subscribe 
to stocks or bonds in aid of any railroad, 
telegraph or other private individual, or 
corporate enterprise, or undertaking. 
The purpose of this constitutional restriction is to insure 
that public funds are spent for public purposes. Most state 
constitutions have similar restrictions, although they may be 
stated in less specific terms. For example, the Connecticut 
constitution provides that Hno man or set of men are entitled 
to exclusive public emoluments.H The literal words of these 
provisions little resemble Article VI, Section 29, but the concept 
is the same and the analysis used in interpreting them is also 
the same. 
Courts look to whether the legislation is for a "public 
purpose." If it is, the legislation does not offend the constitu-
tion, even though there may be incidental benefit to private 
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interests. The Utah Supreme Court held in Utah Housing Finance 
Agency v. Smart. 561 P.2d 1052 (1977): 
While it is improper to spend public funds 
for private purposes, such private benefits 
incidental to a dominant public purpose 
do not detract from the constitutionality 
of the legislation. 
561 P.2d 1055. 
For example, the Treasurer may invest public funds at interest 
while they are within his custody. The purpose of such a procedure 
is to earn interest for the state; but the banks or businesses 
which receive the investments also benefit. The standard to 
be used is whether the primary purpose is to benefit the public 
or whether it is to benefit a private interest. 
The legislative findings of a public purpose are entitled 
to great weight. The legislature found that "presently available 
capital in Utah is inadequate to assure the development of small 
and emerging businesses in the field of high technology" and 
that "the development of such businesses is necessary to create 
new jobs in competition with sister states, and to insure progress 
and increasing productivity in Utah's agriculture, mining and 
minerals development, health, safety, environmental protection 
and other services and industries." Utah Code Ann., Section 
63-30-3(1)(a) and (d). 
Legislators, as well as judges take an oath to uphold the 
constitution. The same electorate which establishes the constitution 
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also elects representatives to make its lavs. It is not for 
the courts to question the motives of the legislature, or to 
second guess the basis for its findings. A legislative finding 
of a public purpose will withstand constitutional challenge 
if it has a rational basis and is not manifestly specious. 
Obviously, the creation of employment and encouragement of innovation 
is a rational public goal. Some may disagree with the legislative 
findings, but the findings are certainly not wholly specious. 
The Utah Technology and Innovation Act, therefore, does not 
offend Article VI, Section 29 of the Utah Constitution. 
II. ARTICLE V, SECTION 1 - SEPARATION OF POWERS 
The Utah Constitution, like the United States Constitution, 
adopts the concept of separation of powers. The United States 
Constitution, however, does not do so explicitly; rather it 
outlines in broad terms the functions of the three branches 
of government. In contrast, the Utah Constitution explicitly 
provides: 
The powers of the government of the State 
of Utah shall be divided into three distinct 
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, 
and the Judicial; and no person charged 
with the exercise of powers properly belonging 
to one of these departments, shall exercise 
any functions appertaining to either of 
the others, except in the cases herein expressly 
directed or permitted. 
Utah Constitution, Article V, Section 1 
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Although Utah cases have dealt with various issues relating 
to "independent agencies,H so far as I am aware, no Utah case 
has answered this question: May governmental authority be exercised 
by an agency or board which is outside of the three branches 
of government? 
For example, in Hanson v. Utah State Retirement Board. 
the court considered the functions of several state agencies, 
and concluded: 
None of the defendant agencies as such is 
an executive department agency. For various 
reasons the legislature has established 
the Industrial Commission, the State Retirement 
Board, and the retirement funds it administers, 
and the State Insurance Fund as independent 
agencies. 
652 P.2d at 1340. 
The Hanson case, however, was concerned exclusively with 
the question of whether such an "independent agency11 was authorized 
to retain private counsel. The issue of whether an agency inde-
pendent of the Executive can exist at all was never considered. 
In Rampton v. Barlow. 23 Utah 2d 383, 464 P.2d 378 (1970) 
the court said: 
[T]he legislative branch should make the 
law, the judicial branch should be confined 
to interpreting it and all other power must 
of necessity be vested in the executive 
branch, which is charged with the enforcement 
of the law, the protection of the statefs 
property, and the looking after the health, 
welfare, and peace of the people. 
23 Utah 2d at 390, 464 P.2d at 383 
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The framers of the Utah Constitution intended that there 
should be three, and only three branches of government. All 
governmental power must be exercised through one of these three 
branches. The Utah Technology Finance Corporation is within 
the Executive Department. That is not to say, of course, that 
it has no right to exist; only that it is bound by the same 
constitutional restrictions as other executive departments, 
boards and agencies. Justice Moffat stated the principle well 
in his opinion in Chez v. Industrial Comm'n, 90 Utah 447, 458, 
62 P.2d 549, 554 (1936): 
If the Legislature may create some floating 
entity without ancestry, set it going as 
an orphan institution under the administration 
of a state-created board, agency, commission 
or what not, acting for and on behalf of 
the state, and that agency may do things 
under a legislative enactment which the 
Legislature is prohibited from enacting 
under the limitations of the Constitution, 
the constitutional limitations or prohibitions 
or mandates become easy of evasion and their 
existence a mere matter of words to be ignored 
or disregarded whenever the desire to accomplish 
a given purpose may suggest a convenient 
procedure• 
The Attorney General correctly argues that UTFC must necessarily 
be within the executive department, and be bound, therefore, 
by the same constitutional restrictions as other executive depart-
ments. He has not argued, however, which of these restrictions 
he believes to be applicable. I would think that allowing legis-
lators to serve on the board of trustees of UTFC is probably 
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a violation of Article V# Section 1. There may be other constitu-
tional provisions which limit UTFC^s powers. 
III. ARTICLE VI. SECTION 1 - DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER 
The legislature may not delegate its essential functions 
to the executive branch. For example, it may not allow the 
executive branch to criminalize conduct State v. Gallion, 572 
P.2d 683 (Utah 1977); or impose a tax, Western Leather & Finding 
Co. v. State Tax Comm'n. 87 Utah 277, 48 P.2d 526 (1935). 
The Attorney General objects to the provision of the Act 
which allows UTFC to invest funds at its own discretion. This, 
he argues, is a delegation of the essential legislative function 
of appropriation. 
Salt Lake City v. I.A. of Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786 (Utah 
1977), held that an act allowing binding arbitration in municipal 
labor disputes was unconstitutional. The key element in this 
case is that the arbitrators could set wages and conditions 
of employment at any level; perhaps even requiring a tax increase. 
The Act before the Court is different. UTFC does not have the 
ability to set the level of expenditure; it has the right to 
determine the apportionment of funds allocated by the legislature. 
Certainly it would be an impermissible abdication of legislative 
responsibility to allow the executive branch complete discretion 
in the allocation of funds. The legislature is not required, 
however, to designate the specific use of every penny. It is 
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sufficient if reasonably specific standards and methods of account-
ability are employed. Section 63-30-5, sets forth the criteria 
for use of corporation funds. They require that private sources 
provide, at least, equal matching funds; that the corporation 
remain in a non-controlling minority position; that the corporation 
insure that it receive status reports; investments are limited 
to Utah businesses; and the Act requires UTFC to consider effects 
on the quality of land, air, water, and general environment. 
The statute also requires an annual report to the Governor 
and legislature. It recjuires an annual audit by the State Auditor 
or a CPA. 
I believe, and hold, that the standards and safeguards 
set forth in the Act are sufficiently specific to limit discretion 
to a degree which places the Act within the limits of the consti-
tution. 
IV. ARTICLE VII, SECTION 15 - THE DEPOSIT OF FUNDS INTO 
A COMMERCIAL BANK 
Article VII, Section 15, of the Utah Constitution provides: 
The State Treasurer shall be the custodian 
of public monies; and shall perform such 
other duties as provided by law. 
The wording could not be clearer. Merely allowing the 
Treasurer to approve depositories or checks does not make the 
Treasurer the custodian of the funds as the constitution requires. 
This is not to say that the legislature may not exclude UTFC 
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from the State Money Management Act or any other legislative 
restriction. Nor is it to say that the legislature may not 
allow UTFC to invest and reinvest its public funds. But when 
the funds are not actually invested for the purposes of the 
Act, they must be in the custody of the Treasurer, not in an 
institution selected by UTFC as Section 63-30-4(2)(b) would 
seem to allow. 
V. ARTICLE VII. SECTION 16 - INDEPENDENT COUNSEL 
Article VII, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
The Attorney General shall be the legal 
advisor of the state officers, except as 
otherwise provided by this Constitution, 
and shall perform such other duties as provided 
by law. 
The Utah Supreme Court interpreted the vague term "state 
officers" in Hanson v. Utah State Retirement Board, 652 P.2d 
1332 (Utah 1982): 
[T]he constitutional authority of the Attorney 
General is to act as legal advisor to the 
constitutional executive officers referred 
to in Article VII, i.e., the Governor, Lt. 
Governor, Auditor, Treasurer, and a Super-
intendant of Public Instruction, the departments 
over which they have direct supervisory 
control, and to the other state executive 
offices referred to in Article VII, insofar 
as the officers of those offices act within 
the scope of the duties of such office. 
652 P.2d at 1336-37. 
The court also cited with approval State v. Yelle, 52 Wash.2d 
856, 329 P.2d 841 (1958) where the Washington Supreme Court 
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interpreted a substantially identical constitutional provision 
to apply only to elected officials. 
Once it is determined that the legislature may establish 
an agency which is essential executive in nature, but is not 
within the direct supervision of the Governor, the same policy 
reasons and the same legal analysis apply to the question of 
whether independent counsel may be retained. The same arguments 
for independence from the Governor apply to independence from 
the Attorney General. If the legislature may create such an 
agency without violating the duties and prerogatives of the 
Governor, it may authorize independent counsel without violating 
the duties and prerogatives of the Attorney General. UTFC may 
exist within the Executive Branch of the government, outside 
the direct supervisory control of the Governor, and it may retain 
independent counsel without violating Article VII, Section 16. 
VI. UTAH CODE ANN.. SECTION 52-4-1, ET SEP.. f!98H - OPEN 
AND PUBLIC MEETINGS 
The Open and Public Meetings Law applies to any "public 
body.11 "Public body" is defined as "any administrative, advisory, 
executive or legislative body of the state or its political 
subdivisions which consist of two or more persons that expends, 
disburses or is supported in whole or in part by tax revenue 
and which is vested with the authority to make decisions regarding 
the publics business." 
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UTFC is a public body. It is subject to the Open and Public 
Meetings law. 
The Attorney General argues that the contract with Venture 
Fund I, the decision to seek revised legislation, and the decision 
to sue for delcaratory judgment are void, not having been made 
at public meetings. The Legislature is clear that the actions 
are "voidable11 rather than "void." The latter two decision 
have been completely implemented and are therefore moot. The 
contract with Venture Fund I, however, is voided. UTFC will 
have to ratify its decision at a public meeting, with appropriate 
public discussion prior to proceeding with the Venture Fund 
I proposal. 
VII. UTAH CODE ANN., SECTION 63-38-8 - UNEXPENDED FUNDS 
Utah Code Ann., Section 63-38-8 provides: 
The state fiscal officer shall, on or before 
July 31 of each fiscal year, close out to 
the proper fund or account all unexpended 
balances of appropriations made by the legis-
lature . . . . 
UTFC was exempted from this provision, effective July 19, 
1985. As I read this statute, the critical date is July 31. 
Because UTFC was exempted prior to that date, the statute did 
not apply in 1985, and the appropriation did not lapse. 
VIII. ARTICLE VI. SECTION 22 - THE TITLE OF SENATE BILL 1 
Without going into detail, I find that the title of Senate 
Bill 1 expresses the subject of the Bill with sufficient clarity 
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and does not violate Article VI, Section 22. 
IX. ARTICLE XII, SECTION 1 - CREATION OF A PRIVATE 
CORPORATION 
The Attorney General argues that if UTFC is found not to 
be a branch of government, then it is a corporation created 
by the legislature in violation of Article XII, Section 1. 
Since I hold that UTFC is a public body within the executive 
branch of the government, this argument does not apply. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah State Treasurer must be the custodian of funds 
appropriated by the Utah Legislature to UTFC. UTFC is an independent 
agency within the executive branch of the government. Members 
of other branches of the government may not serve on its board 
of trustees. With these two exceptions, which I find to be 
minor, and separable, the Act withstands constitutional scrutiny. 
With the two exceptions just mentioned, judgment will be granted 
declaring: 
(a) That UTFC is lawfully constituted to 
undertake the purposes enumerated in the 
Act; and 
(b) That UTFC is lawfully authorized under 
the terms of the Act and the Utah Constitution 
to invest the funds appropriated by the 
legislature, including the appropriated 
funds currently in its possession, together 
with funds otherwise lawfully acquired by 
it, in return for equity interests in Utah 
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high technology businesses, for the principal 
purpose of advancing the public policy declared 
in the Act, and subject to limitations contained 
in the Act; 
(c) UTFC is entitled to retain its own 
independent legal counsel; 
(d) UTFCfs contract with Venture Fund I 
is voidable because the decision to enter 
into the contract was not made in compliance 
with the Utah Open and Public Meeting statute. 
Before UTFC can proceed on such a contract, 
it will have to hold an open meeting with 
proper notices as required by the Utah Public 
Meeting statute; 
(e) UTFC should return its unexpended funds 
to the custody of the State treasury until 
such time as they are expended. 
The Attorney General and the Treasurer are granted Summary 
Judgment as to their second cause of action, to the extent of 
a declaration that UTFC is within the Executive Branch of the 
government; their third cause of action; their eighth cause 
of action to the extent that the transaction with Venture 
Fund I cannot proceed without a proper public meeting. UTFC 
is granted Summary Judgment as to the following causes of action 
in the Attorney General^ Complaint: First cause of action; 
second cause of action to the extent that the Attorney General 
requests a declaration that UTFC has no constitutional basis 
for existence; fourth cause of action; fifth cause of action; 
sixth cause of action; seventh cause of action; eighth cause 
of action to the extent that the Complaint asks that the legislation 
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be declared void and UTFC's lawsuit declared unsustainable because 
the decisions to pursue these actions were made in closed meetings; 
and the tenth cause of action. 
Mr. Sullivan is requested to prepare an appropriate Order, 
and submit it to Mr. Finlayson and to Mr. Hunt for approval 
as to form. 
Dated this J- k? day of December, 1985. 
SCDTTDANIELS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
•*-
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this 3 C-, dav of December, 1985: 
Ralph L. Finlayson 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Mfarold G. Christensen 
George A. Hunt 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P. O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Alan L. Sullivan 
P. O. Box 3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400 
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APPENDIX D 
Undisputed Pacts of Attorney General and 
State Treasurer Stated in Connection with 
Cross-motions for Summary Judgment. 
appointment of i t s own l e g a l counsel , and S.B. No. 1 upon which 
the appointment i s based f unconst i tut ional? 
7 . Does the long t i t l e of S.B. No. 1 
uncons t i tu t iona l ly f a i l to c l e a r l y express the subject of the 
b i l l insofar as i t exempts UTFC from State Treasurer and Attorney 
General involvement? 
8. I f UTFC i s not a publ ic e n t i t y within the Executive 
branch of government subject to publ ic management and contro l , 
does UTFC then subs i s t uncons t i tu t iona l ly as a corporation 
created by a spec ia l act? 
9 . I s the prohib i t ion of Utah Const, a r t . VI, § 29 
aga ins t lending the s t a t e ' s c r e d i t v io la ted by S.B. No. 1 and by 
cer ta in uses t o which UTFC puts i t s public-source moneys. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The undisputed f a c t s necessary for the reso lut ion of 
the i s s u e s presented in t h i s motion are as f o l l o w s : 
1 . The statewide Utah e l e c t o r a t e re jec ted a 1974 
propos i t ion t o allow the Leg i s la ture to authorize the State or 
any p o l i t i c a l subdiv is ion of the S t a t e , t o lend i t s cred i t "to 
aid in the establishment or expansion of pr ivate industry, within 
the S t a t e . " The vote t o r e j e c t that propos i t ion was 240,813 
(against) to 129,833 ( f o r ) . l 
2 . The Utah Technology and Innovation Act of 1983 was 
1 A c e r t i f i e d copy of the return showing the re j ec t ing v o t e - t a l l y 
and a copy of the propos i t ion , taken together , c o n s t i t u t e Exhibit 
1 , annexed hereto . 
amended by S. B. No. I.2 
3. In November, 1984, UTFC issued a letter of intent 
to Venture Fund I indicating its intent to commit $1 million to 
purchase an unsecured limited partnership interest in Venture 
Fund I on certain conditions. 
4. Don A. Stringhamr while a UTFC Trustee, moved in a 
September 23, 1983 meeting "to establish a combined venture fund 
with private and the public monies of the corporation." 
5. Don A. Stringham is a principal shareholder in 
Impetus, Inc., which is the general partner of Venture Fund I. 
6. Impetus, Inc., under the OTFC-Venture Fund I deal, 
would receive as compensation a fee equal to 2% of paid in 
capital and an annual management fee of at least $100,000. 
7. At the time UTFC chose Venture Fund I, with 
Impetus, Inc., as general partner, John M. Scowcroft was both a 
UTFC Trustee and a director and principal shareholder of Impetus, 
Inc. 
8. At the time UTFC chose Venture Fund I, with 
Impetus, Inc. as general partner, Wayne S. Brown, a former UTFC 
Trustee, was the chairman of the Board of Directors and a 
principal shareholder of Impetus, Inc. 
2
 Act of July 16, 1985, S. B. No. 1, First Special Session (to be 
codified at Utah Code Ann. § 63-60-1 through -6) (Sections of 
S.B. No. 1 are hereinafter cited by the section numbers they are 
to be codified under with the notation "S. B. No. 1"). A copy 
S.B. No. 1 is annexed as Exhibit 2. 
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9 . A member of the law firm representing UTFC in t h i s 
l i t i g a t i o n , David L. G i l l e t t e , i s a d irector of Impetus, Inc . 
1 0 . UTFC obtained o f f i c e space from a company in which 
one UTFC Trustee, Don A. Stringham, had a f inanc ia l i n t e r e s t as 
an i n v e s t o r . 
1 1 . In 1984 UTFC committed t o pay out, or committed to 
pay out and paid out , to Utah Innovation Foundation (UIF) 
$150,000 of public-source funds. 
1 2 . At the time of the commitment or payout or both 
referred to in the immediately preceding paragraph, one UTFC 
Trustee, Don A. Stringham, was a UIF Trustee, and one former UTFC 
Trustee, Wayne S. Brown was a UIF Trustee. 
1 3 . An addit ional $150,000 has been or soon w i l l be 
paid by UTFC to UIF. 
14. At the present t ime, Karl N. Snow, J r . , i s both a 
UTFC Trustee and a UIF Trustee. 
1 5 . Eugene Overfe l t i s both a UTFC Trustee and a 
Senior Officer in Commercial Securi ty Bank (CSB). 
16 . CSB has been t o the present , or unt i l very 
recent ly , the deposi tor for a l l of UTFC's received and a s - y e t -
unspent funds. 
17 . UTFC received $1.2 mi l l i on of s t a t e publ ic monies 
in f i s c a l year 1984-85, was appropriated $2.0 m i l l i o n of s t a t e 
publ ic monies for f i s c a l year 1985-86, and was appropriated 
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through the S ta te in f i s c a l year 1984-85 an addi t ional $500,000 
of federa l funds . 
18 . All meetings of UTFC have been held without any 
no t i ce of the type required under Utah Code Ann. SS 52-4-1 
through 52-4-9 (1981) having been g iven . 
19 . One m i l l i o n and twenty thousand d o l l a r s 
appropriated t o UTFC under ITEM 75 of H. B. No. 183 of 1984 was 
unexpended as of the end of the 1984-85 f i s c a l year . 
2 0 . One member of the Governor's s t a f f and the 
Executive Director of the Executive agency, Department of 
Community and Economic Development, are SJL o f f i c i o members of the 
UTFC board. 
2 1 . The f inancing arrangement between UTFC and Venture 
Fund I does not provide for the issuance of bonds payable only 
out of revenues of the aided e n t e r p r i s e , but provides for d irec t 
unsecured investment in private bus inesses of the money Venture 
Fund I rece ived from UTFC. 
2 2 . The r e s u l t s of f e a s i b i l i t y programs of companies 
that have been awarded grants under UTFC's Utah Small Business 
Innovation Program, including but not l imi ted t o ideas regarding 
innovat ive proces ses , products, s e r v i c e s , bas i c research, 
manufacturing or marketing, are not publ ic domain. 
23 . The State does not r e c e i v e , through UTFC or 
otherwise , f a i r l e g a l cons iderat ion in return for grants made by 
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UTFC under i t s Small Business Innovation Program or other 
programs. 
DISPUTED "FACTS" 
The a s s e r t i o n s of UTFC in i t s s e c t i o n e n t i t l e d FACTS 
are disputed as fo l l ows : 
1 . Responding t o paragraph 1 , Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-60-
3(1)(d) and 63-60-3(1) (a ) do not read as UTFC has paraphrased 
them, but are rebuttable l e g i s l a t i v e statements that speak for 
themselves . 
2 . Responding t o paragraph 2 , Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-60-
4 does not read as UTFC has paraphrased i t , but contains 
rebuttable l e g i s l a t i v e statements that speak for themselves. 
3 . Responding to paragraph 4 , the impl icat ion of 
lawfulness of UTFC's "authority" t o inves t i s disputed. 
4 . Responding to paragraph 5, the impl icat ion that the 
l ega l quest ions regarding Venture Fund I w i l l be resolved in 
favor of UTFC i s d isputed. 
INTRODUCTION 
I . CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY 
It is axiomatic that when there is conflict between the 
Constitution and statutory provisions, the Constitution prevails. 
It is not here disputed that courts will harmonize a statute with 
constitutional provisions when that is reasonably possible. 
But the Court has repeatedly stated, in the course of striking 
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APPENDIX E 
Affidavit of Edward T. Alter, State 
Treasurer, Injunction Hearing of March 17, 1986. 
RALPH L. FINLAYSON, ESQ. (A1076) 
Assistant Attorney General 
STEPHEN J. SORENSON, ESQ. (A3049) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 533-5261 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH TECHNOLOGY FINANCE 
CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
DAVID L. WILKINSON, 
Attorney General of Utah, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON, 
Attorney General, for 
the State of Utah, and 
EDWARD T. ALTER, 
State Treasurer for 
the State of Utah, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
-vs-
UTAH TECHNOLOGY FINANCE 
CORPORATION, and its Board 
of Trustees, namely, 
SYDNEY J. GREEN, EUGENE 
OVERFELT, WILLARD H. 
GARDINER, JAMES S. JARDINE, 
WARREN E. PUGH, ROBERT H. 
GARFF, and KARL N. SNOW, JR., 
and John Does I-X, 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
EDWARD T. ALTER, 
STATE TREASURER 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 860097 
Defendants-Respondents. 
EDWARD T. ALTER, having been duly sworn, deposes and 
states: 
1. I am State Treasurer for the State of Utah. I make 
this affidavit on the basis of my personal knowledge. 
2. I do not hold any interests in Venture Capital 
funds in behalf of the State because I am barred from doing so 
under D.C.A., 1953, S 51-7-11(3) (1985 Supp.). 
3. There is no regular resale market for limited 
partnership interests in Venture Capital funds. 
DATED this 17th day of March, 1986. 
TAWSI_ I. QITC 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this / » day of March, 1986, there personally 
appeared before me EDWARD T. ALTER, the signer of the foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the 
same. 
My Commission Expires: 
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NOTARY PUBLIC ^ , ' . _ . 
R e s i d i n g a t : *•» f n / <L ' < 
HARVARD R. HINTON 
\ Hour) PuMic Slate of Ut:i> 
;
 |% Cowmtuiof Expires Oct *. I&E7 
I IUs4t in U^i. Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF MATLTMG 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of 
the foregoing Affidavit of the State Treasurer, and the 
accompanying letter to Mr. Butler to: 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Alan L. Sullivan 
Patrick J. O'Hara 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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